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Domestic intelligence is very important in preventing
disorder while ensuring unity and security during a time of
national crisis. However, if uncontrolled, domestic
intelligence can be subject to political misuse, which
causes serious damage both to individuals and to democratic
institutions.
There are various theoretical explanations for
political misuse of domestic intelligence. The political use
of domestic intelligence is best explained by the
sociological theory of unfulfilled needs. On the other hand,
political counterintelligence can be best explained by
Threat Theory. In order for a domestic intelligence
organization to be effective, its organizational discretion
must be limited by establishing clear legislation that is
not secret, on the focus, limits, and techniques of domestic
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The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have
demonstrated that the most common response to threats to
domestic security, be it in the United States or any other
nation-state, is an expansion of the power of domestic
intelligence agencies (Hoffman, 2001; Coggins, 2001). By
expanding the power of its domestic intelligence, a country
simply aims to prevent disorder while ensuring unity and
security during a time of national crisis (Keller, 1989;
Oseth, 1985).
Indeed, domestic intelligence involves the secret
collection and maintenance of information in advance about
the individuals and organizations who are thought to pose a
threat to internal security. When this information is used
effectively, it provides a warning, allowing time to take
counter measures to avoid potential danger or even disaster
(Morgan, 1980).
However, uncontrolled, domestic intelligence has the
potential to cause serious damage both to individuals and to
democratic institutions (Elliff, 1979). It may even
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encourage social polarization and disunity when it is
prejudicially used against minorities in the society.
It must be noted that the nature of intelligence work
is distinguished from other functions of the state in that
intelligence activities are carried out in secrecy. Targeted
suspects are often observed without their knowledge. In
fact, secrecy is a tool vital to intelligence operations.
Despite its benefits, secrecy is also a detriment to
intelligence work. That is, secrecy may prevent the
effective control of intelligence organizations. This lack
of effective control may allow, if not encourage, the misuse
of intelligence. This misuse may occur in various forms.
Those who are in power may use their intelligence to promote
their own individual interests instead of the public good
(Morgan, 1980; Theoharis, 1978). On the other hand, domestic
intelligence may be used to repress those with political
views that lawfully challenge the socio-economic status quo
(Marx, 1988; Theoharis, 1978).
For example, intelligence may be used against the
political opponents of government officials. In such a case,
innocent people may be wiretapped or surveilled. Their
private secrets and relationships may be discovered,
and used as blackmail.
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Intelligence may be used to prevent the expansion of
political movements that threaten majority politics.
Derogatory information about the leaders of these movements
may be obtained and released, or they may be harassed and
made painfully aware that they are under surveillance.
On the other hand, intelligence activities that involve
a misuse of power are often difficult to detect. Secrecy
poses an important obstacle against disclosure of such a
misuse. Further, the termination of misuse becomes more
difficult due to lack of public knowledge. Intelligence
regulation is often sparked by the general public. Their
ignorance generally means that reform does not take place
(Schmidt, 2000; Johnson, 1996; Donner, 1980; Poveda, 1990;
Elliff, 1979).
These potential hazards, the absence of regulation or
internal and external control, contribute to the
transformation of domestic intelligence into a dangerous
instrument of political misuse, oppression and intimidation
(Elliff, 1971).
This project involves a case study of the political
misuse of domestic intelligence by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI). This study will attempt to:
1-Analyze the different forms of political misuse of
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domestic intelligence;
2-Find out theoretical explanations of the misuse and
discover any contributing factors;
3-Examine the consequences of the misuse;
4-Explore the countermeasures to prevent future misuse.
Research Questions
It must be noted here that secret nature of
intelligence poses an important threat preventing scholarly
research from uncovering all relevant official or unofficial
records on the relationship between domestic intelligence
and politics. Therefore, the focus of this study is limited
with the publicly available information on the issue.
In accordance with the objectives of the study, the
following research questions are proposed:
1-In what way was FBI domestic intelligence misused for
political gain?
2-Why was FBI intelligence misused for political
reasons and what factors contributed to this process?
3-What were the consequences of the political misuse of
FBI domestic intelligence?
4-What can be done to prevent the political misuse of
domestic intelligence?
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Significance of the Study
Domestic intelligence has vital importance in providing
domestic security since it detects and prevents potential
internal security threats. However, if uncontrolled,
domestic intelligence has potential to turn into a dangerous
instrument of political misuse, which has to be prevented
for effective use of domestic intelligence. The purpose of
this study, within the given limitations and publicly
available information, is to find out forms of political
misuse, its theoretical explanations. Moreover, this study
makes some policy recommendations to prevent future misuse.
Methodology
This study is an analysis of the political misuse of
FBI domestic intelligence. This analysis will use several
tools to dissect, organize, assess, and analyze FBI policy.
Also, the researcher will approach this material using in-
depth comprehensive case study techniques to provide a
broader perspective covering not only the facts but also the
overall conditions related to the use of FBI intelligence.
In order to identify variables and get a general
outline of the study, a preliminary literature review was
done. In this phase of the study, three of the most
prominent books in the field were used, namely, The Reform
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of the FBI Intelligence Operations (Elliff, 1979),
Lawlessness and Reform, The FBI in Transition, (Poveda,
1990), and A Brief History of the FBI’s Role and Powers
(Theoharis, 1999). As a result, three major variables were
defined in accordance with the research objectives and
questions. They are:
1-Domestic Intelligence: Domestic intelligence involves
the secret collection and maintenance of information about
the individuals or organizations that are thought to
threaten the internal security of a state.
2-Political misuse of intelligence: Political misuse of
intelligence refers to the illegitimate use of intelligence
to influence the redistribution of national resources in
favor of those who are in power, instead of public good.
Political misuse of intelligence has two forms:
(a)political use of intelligence and (b)political
counterintelligence. The political use of intelligence
involves the promotion of the particular interests of the
government officials over the public good, namely domestic
security. The term political counterintelligence refers to
the use of intelligence to repress those who are lawful but
have political views that challenge the socio-economic
status quo.
7
3-Prevention of political misuse of domestic
intelligence: This term refers to the establishment of
countermeasures to protect the public against the misuse of
domestic intelligence.
To address all of the variables and questions involved
in this research, a literature review was conducted. In
addition to library research, the Internet was used to
acquire the most recent information available. In all
searches, “domestic intelligence”, “political intelligence”,
“political counterintelligence”, “cointelpro”, and “abuse of
FBI” were used as key words.
First, the University of North Texas (UNT) library card
catalog and electronic research database were searched for
books and articles on the subject. While searching UNT
electronic sources, JSTOR -an engine that provides access to
journals in the Arts and Science- was used along with the
Criminal Justice Abstracts which provides access to data in
criminology and related disciplines, a virtual warehouse of
journals, books, and reports.
The found materials were examined carefully and those
related to the variables of the study were selected for
primary examination. Of those books and articles that had
the same topic, the more recent ones were selected in order
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to take advantage of updated information in the study.
While searching the Internet, Yahoo, AltaVista, and
Google search engines were used. The documents found within
each search engine were examined carefully to see whether
they were suitable for this study. Approximately 650
articles were found in these searches.
Once all the information was obtained from these
searches, it was categorized in accordance with the research
questions, considering that each research question applies
to a different component of the study. At the end of this
step, four categories of data were defined. This data was
analyzed starting from the category that relates
to the first research question, continuing respectively.
During the course of the data analysis, follow-up
searches were conducted to locate specific articles or books
that were deemed to be important for the study. For example
when a source stated that Congress had published a
particularly prominent report on the misuse of intelligence,
the researcher located this report in the UNT library
catalog and included it in the study.
It must be noted that, the interpretation of political
events is often naturally biased. People of different
political ideologies or social contexts might have different
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explanations for the same issue. This may influence the
researcher’s impartiality, if the researcher focuses on the
sources that are of same or similar political ideologies or
social context only, which may pose a validity problem for
the study. Therefore, a neutral and valid study of such an
issue requires the inclusion of multiple sources whenever
possible. Based on this rationale, the researcher has paid
careful attention to the use of multiple sources, including
official documents such as FBI reports, memorandums,
legislative oversight reports, and Congressional hearings
when applicable to verify the obtained information. This
method of verifying information through the use of multiple
sources enables the researcher to build a cross validation
of the study.
As for validity, data collection from multiple sources
provides a broader range of perspectives and attitudes about
the issues involved. Since there is only one researcher, a
reliability problem is not expected.
Limitations
This study, in essence, provides an in-depth analysis
of the FBI’s politically motivated domestic intelligence
activities dating back to the year 1917 when the Bureau was
first established. Although the cases are here presented in
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chronological order, this study is not meant to be a full
historical analysis of the FBI’s political agenda.
Therefore, historically speaking, only the most noteworthy
of these cases are referred to insofar as they provide
insight into an exploration of the various forms of
politically motivated domestic intelligence abuse.
It must be noted that the findings of FBI
investigations generally are not publicly available. For
example, as discussed in chapter two of this study, although
many authors report that the FBI was directed to collect and
disseminate critical information about Senator Martin Dies
of Texas, Chairman of the House Special Committee to
Investigate Un-American Activities and Propaganda, the
conclusion or results of these activities are not mentioned.
Additionally, this study does not aim to discover guilt
or innocence. Rather, it aims to determine what caused the
abuse of domestic intelligence and what can be done to
prevent this abuse in terms of establishing effective
command and control of domestic intelligence.
On the other hand, one may question validity of this
research. Indeed, the secret nature of intelligence poses an
important validity threat. That is, due to official secrecy,
scholarly research focusing on the relationship between
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domestic intelligence and politics cannot possibly uncover
all relevant official and unofficial records. Some aspects
of certain incidents may never be revealed.
Though the Freedom of information Act enables
interested parties to request official documents and
information from the FBI, one cannot know to what degree
these requests are honored. Therefore, it seems hardly
possible to reach any legitimate conclusion about the full
extent of relations between the FBI and politics. Most of
the cases reported here take their roots from secret
authorizations and directives that are originally disclosed
solely on a need-to-know basis. Furthermore, some cases may
be kept outside of the normal records system. These
complications essentially cripple not only the researcher of
this study but also any other researchers in the field.
However, multiple sources will be used to minimize this
validity threat.
Legal issues regarding the use of intelligence
techniques and tactics like wiretapping, bugging, informant
infiltration, mail recovery, and surveillance are so broad
that each one of them can be a separate topic for an in-
depth study. Therefore, the legal aspects of intelligence
are beyond the focus of this study.
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Finally, as with all case studies, the reader must
exercise caution before attempting to generalize the
findings of this study. The situations found herein are
unique and may not be applicable to other countries and
organizations. Specifically, the FBI and the United states
are the focus of this study. In order to be able to
generalize the findings of this study, further research is
required within other countries and organizations.
Overview of the Forthcoming Chapters
This study is composed of five chapters including this
first one.
In Chapter 2, intelligence is defined and three main
operational functions of intelligence (information
gathering, covert actions, counterintelligence), and the
difference between criminal investigations and intelligence
investigations are touched upon. A brief overview of the FBI
domestic intelligence is also given to provide background
information to the reader.
The third chapter discusses the term political misuse
and introduces its forms (political use and political
counterintelligence) looking at the FBI domestic
intelligence. Each form of misuse is given examples from the
publicly known historical events.
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In the fourth chapter, theoretical explanations of the
misuse are done taking advantage of “corruption” theories,
and the “Threat theory.” Consequences of the misuse are also
included in this section of the study.
The last chapter is devoted to policy recommendations
to prevent political misuse of domestic intelligence in the
future. The need for establishing clear legislations on the
scope, and limitations of domestic intelligence
investigations, as well as effective control mechanisms are
also included in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND THE FBI
Intelligence can be described as the secret collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information in advance, about
key events, circumstances and personalities of interest
(Johnson 1996). It has three unique operational functions.
The first of these functions, information gathering,
consists of four stages. In the “targeting” stage, the
individuals, organizations, and events of interest are
defined. The “gathering” stage involves the collection of
desired information through overt or covert sources and may
include the practice of informant infiltration, technical or
physical surveillance, or the interception of communication.
In the “analysis” stage, collected information is evaluated
in an attempt to interpret what it really means. The
“dissemination” stage involves deciding where to send which
information. All four of these stages are isolated from the
environment outside the intelligence organization by secrecy
(Richelson, 1999; Gill, 1998; Johnson, 1996; Ransom, 1970).
Covert actions are the second operational function of
intelligence agencies. They are designed to promote the
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interests of one nation by influencing the events and
politics of other nations, without disclosing official
involvement (Borosage, 1976).
Covert actions may take various forms. Political advice
and counsel may be provided to leaders and influential
individuals in foreign states, encouraging them to act as
desired. Intelligence organizations may tend to develop
contacts with those who might hold leadership positions in
the future. Political parties may be helped financially to
influence the politics of a country. Finally, covert
propaganda activities may be conducted in cooperation with
foreign media and journalists to influence public opinion
(Oseth, 1985).
Covert actions are normally carried out in foreign
territories, but there is always the potential that they
might turn inward. However, domestic arena is ordinarily not
considered appropriate for covert actions (Oseth, 1985). It
is generally seen as harmful to the democratic nature of a
state when one of its own offices tries to influence
domestic politics.
The third function of intelligence work is
counterintelligence. This involves all activities to detect,
lawfully counter and neutralize the activities of foreign
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and/or hostile intelligence organizations that may adversely
influence national interests (Oseth, 1985; US Senate Select
Committee, 1976, vol.1; Ransom, 1970).
Counterintelligence activities are of two types:
passive (defensive) or active (offensive). Passive
activities are designed to improve security. They may
involve careful screening and regulation of personnel who
have access to sensitive information. This screening may
utilize security authorizations, polygraph examinations,
procedures and rules for handling classified materials, or
encryption techniques. Physical security measures are
passive as well, and may include the installation of badge
and pass systems, alarms, surveillance and warning devices,
or fence or other barriers. Finally, passive
counterintelligence may consist of area control techniques
including curfews, checkpoints, and border control
regulations.
Active (offensive) counterintelligence measures may
take the form of covert surveillance methods, such as
informant infiltration, physical and technical surveillance,
and record keeping. This may also consist of intrusive
techniques designed to manipulate ongoing hostile
activities. It has been argued that offensive
17
counterintelligence must be allowed to operate beyond the
legal standards of the criminal justice system because it
addresses the high purpose of preventing possible national
security disasters. For example, it is argued that
intelligence investigations should be allowed even when
there is no evidence that a crime has been committed (Oseth,
1985).
The Difference Between Criminal Investigations
and Intelligence Investigations
Criminal and intelligence investigations both exist for
the purpose of collecting information to discover the truth.
Some of their investigative techniques are quite similar if
not identical. For example, both may use interviews,
wiretaps, or physical surveillance to collect information.
It must be noted, however, that there are differences
between intelligence investigations and criminal
investigations. First and foremost, they have different
purposes. While the information obtained in a criminal
investigation is used for prosecution, the goal of domestic
intelligence investigations is not always prosecution. It
may be to discover potential threats to national security
and help policy makers formulate policies to counter these
dangers (Ransom, 1970).
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Secondly, the initiation of a criminal investigation
requires some evidence of the commission of a crime or
evidence at least showing a preparation for the commission
of a crime. Furthermore, the evidence collected in a
criminal investigation often must be evidence related to a
specific crime. On the other hand, a domestic intelligence
investigation may be opened in the absence of a crime, to
collect background information on the activities of targets
(US General Accounting Office, 1977).
Domestic Intelligence and The FBI
Intelligence can be divided into two separate
categories based on geography and the intended target.
Foreign intelligence works on an international level,
keeping tabs on the workings of other countries and their
people. On the other hand, domestic intelligence is
primarily confined within the national boundaries and
citizenry of a country. While these two are perceptibly
opposites, overlap of these jurisdictions is possible.
Traditionally, both types of intelligence activities
are subject to different rules and standards of suitability.
Domestic intelligence is expected to obey constitutional
prohibitions against governmental invasion of individual
rights and privacies. In foreign intelligence activities,
19
though similar or even identical operational techniques are
used, more discretion and broader operational autonomy is
granted (Oseth, 1985).
The FBI’s domestic intelligence function is carried out
within the boundaries of the United States. It focuses on
the “enemy within,” namely individuals or organizations that
are thought to threaten internal security. The FBI compiles
information about these individuals and organizations for
future reference, even if they are not necessarily connected
to a known crime (Morgan, 1980).
It must be noted once more that the major focus of this
study is the abuse of domestic intelligence by the FBI.
Though some example cases are presented for analysis in
Chapter 3, it is essential at this point that one have
understanding of how the FBI became established as a
political machine over the course of time. A brief
historical overview follows outlining six critical periods
in FBI history. They are: World War I and the Red Scare Era
(1917-1920), the World War II Era (1934-1945), the Cold War
Era (1948-1955), the Law and Order Crisis of the 1960s, the
1980s, and the FBI Today.
World War I and Red Scare Era (1917-1920)
During and after World War I (WWI), the Bureau of
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Intelligence, a forerunner of the FBI, was tasked to deal
with national security matters such as espionage, and
sabotage. This move was sparked by concern over one of the
largest waves of alien immigration in US history, a wave
predominantly Eastern European in origin. Immigrants came
from Italy, Austria, Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan and
Baltic states. Their new language and customs made them
immediately suspicious. US involvement in WWI only increased
that suspicion, so the Bureau of Intelligence was developed
to counter the fear that these groups might cripple the US
government (Theoharis, 1999; McLemore & Komo 1998).
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 only added to concern
about the new wave of immigrants. It was feared that local
groups might organize a coup in the US or otherwise move to
overthrow the US government in the name of socialism
(Schmidt, 2000).
These concerns seemed justified after terrorist attacks
took place in 1919. In addition to an attack against the
Attorney General Palmer, postal authorities captured thirty-
six packages containing bombs addressed to prominent
politicians, judges and other state officials. In response
to this, the Radical Division was established in the Bureau
of Investigation to deal with radical political activities.
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This division was subsequently renamed the General
Intelligence Division (Powers, 1987; Morgan, 1980; US Senate
Select Committee, 1976, vol.4).
The FBI authorization for non-criminal investigations
in these years originated from a 1916 statute. This statute
empowered the FBI to conduct non-criminal investigations
concerning the activities of foreign governments when
requested by the State Department. It should be noted that
the FBI’s domestic intelligence function was created with
the sole intention of monitoring alien activities within the
US borders (Donner, 1980).
In 1918, the authority of the Bureau was strengthened
with the enactment of two laws: The Sedition Act of 1918,
and the Immigration Act of 1918. The Sedition Act banned
oral or written critics of the US government, the
constitution, or the armed services. It also banned the use
of any language intended to encourage resistance to the
United States, or to support the enemies of the US. The
Immigration Act required the deportation of aliens who were
members of organizations that encouraged disorder or the
removal of the US government from power by force (Morgan,
1980; Theoharis, 1999).
In 1924, the first one of the Attorney General
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Guidelines were issued to regulate the Bureau’s activities.
These guidelines became known as the Stone Guidelines, and
linked the Bureau investigations to violation of law. These
guidelines were prepared in response to two incidents: the
Palmer Raids of 1919 and 1920, and the Teapot Dome scandal
of 1923-1924. These are discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 3. Suffice it to say, the Bureau ceased its
intelligence functions and operated solely as a law
enforcement agency until the 1930s (Williams, 1981; Poveda,
1990).
The World War II Era (1934-1945)
During this time frame, the FBI began to view those who
claimed affiliation with fascist and communist groups as
internal security threats in addition to still-prevalent
concerns about foreign immigrants. This concern over these
new political groups was based on several factors. First of
all, these two movements were inspired by the economic
crisis brought about by the Great Depression (1929-1939)
This complete failure of the US economic system resulted in
the loss of public confidence in the government.
Secondly, fascist and communist movements were thought
to have been influenced by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia,
and members of these movements were seen as possible
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recruits of the enemy.
Because of these and other concerns, the US
administration felt it necessary to take measures to prevent
any potential danger. In 1934, President Roosevelt
reinstated the intelligence function of the FBI gradually,
ordering it to investigate whether communist and Nazi
sympathizers posed any potential threat to the economic and
social well-being of the United States. Also, the FBI was
ordered to investigate whether these groups were subject to
foreign direction and control, especially by the Germans.
In 1936, President Roosevelt ordered the FBI Director
to gather general intelligence information concerning
subversive activities in the US, particularly focusing on
Fascists and Communists (O’Reilly, 1982; Schmidt, 2000;
Stephan, 2000; Poveda, 1990). This order was used for
justification of all domestic intelligence operations until
the 1970s when a series of incidents led to the discovery of
the misuse of intelligence by the FBI. These incidents and
the reform that resulted from them are discussed later in
this chapter.
The office which was tasked with the investigation of
perceived national security threats became the National
Defense Division in 1941. It was renamed the Security
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Division in 1943 (Rosenfeld, 1999).
In response to the same perceived threats, Congress
passed new laws. In 1939, Congress enacted the Hatch Act,
which ceased federal employment for anyone who was a member
of any organization advocating removal of the government
from power by force. That same year, the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 required the registration of
foreign agents with the Justice Department. In 1940, the
Alien Registration Act (or Smith Act) was enacted, requiring
that alien residents had to be fingerprinted. This act also
banned teaching subjects that include examples of
overthrowing the government by force (Donner, 1980;
Theoharis, 1999).
These acts opened the door to the principle of guilt by
association. That is, members of the Communist party were
automatically suspected of being agents of the enemy, and
therefore, were considered to be dangerous to national
security (Buranelli & Buranelli, 1982; Stephan, 2000). With
the outbreak of WWII in 1939, the fact that communists-led
unions had called a number of strikes against key defense
suppliers (such as North American Aviation) further
increased concerns that these groups might be recruits for
the enemy (Stephan, 2000; Leab, 2000).
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The FBI’s political role was institutionalized during
WWII with the initiation of the Federal Loyalty Program in
1943 to prevent the penetration of subversive or disloyal
persons into the government. This program empowered the FBI
to decide who was or was not dangerous (Schmidt, 2000).
In 1946, the Custodial Detention Program was started
without legal authorization. The purpose of this program was
to compile a list of “dangerous” individuals who were likely
enemy sympathizers working for the Germans, Italians, or
Communists. The only legal source of this program, the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was passed after the
initiation of the program (Theoharis, 1999).
This practice of collecting information about
individuals and organizations emerged in response to the
need to detect possible agents of enemies in war-time
(Powers, 1987; Schmidt, 2000; Rosenfeld, 1999; Morgan,
1980). However, in later years, it will be argued that this
information was used for purposes other than security, for
example, for harassment of these groups. This issue is
largely discussed in Chapter 3 of the study.
In the WWII era, the FBI’s domestic intelligence
function was initiated to prevent the manipulation of
domestic political groups by foreign enemies (Hearing Before
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the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee,
1974). Its major function was to gather information and to
provide the executive branch with preventive intelligence
needed to make decisions about internal security threats.
These threats were labeled as subversives and included
communists, extremists, and dissents (Keller, 1989; Davis,
1997; Powers, 1987; Morgan, 1980).
The Cold War and McCarthyism Era (1948-1955)
The McCarthy Era of the early 1950s was characterized
by alarm about the growing influence of communism in the US.
This period takes its name from a US Senator, Joseph
McCarthy, who had made communism a political issue in his
first campaign for the Wisconsin Senate seat. In this
period, the FBI targeted mainly the enemy within, the US
communists (Keller, 1989).
In response to perceived treats, Congress passed two
laws in this era. The Internal Security Act of 1950 (The
McCarran Act) authorized the deportation of alien radicals,
banned the employment of communists in defense industries,
forbade issuing passports for communists, and required
communist, communist-front, and communist-action
organizations to register as foreign agents with the
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB). It further
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required communist organizations to submit a list of their
members to the SACB, and authorized the detention of
"dangerous radicals" during a national state of emergency
(Theoharis, 1999).
The Communist Control Act of 1954 extended the McCarran
Act's registration requirements to include "Communist-
infiltrated" organizations (Powers, 1987, p.340). The basic
rationale behind this act was that the Communist Party of
the US was assumed to be foreign manipulated (Morgan, 1980).
The Law and Order Crisis of the 1960s
This era is well known as a period of civil unrest due
to Civil Rights Movement, student anti-war demonstrations,
and the assassinations of prominent public figures,
including President John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights leader
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In response to the public
disorder of this period, the FBI conducted five disruptive
counterintelligence operations against domestic targets, for
which it has received much criticism (Donner, 1980; Davis,
1997). The FBI’s operations were centered around the
Communist Party-U.S.A, the Socialist Workers Party, White
Hate Groups, Black Extremists, and the New Left. These
operations are discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. Suffice
it to say that within this period, it is argued that the FBI
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did not hesitate to use clearly illegal and aggressive
techniques to investigate and neutralize political
extremists who opposed the state including civil rights
activists, racists, and anti-war demonstrators (Keller,
1989).
Characteristics of the Eras
All of these eras have some common characteristics that
arguably provoked governmental reaction. A broad overview of
the commonalities of each era will be discussed in Chapter 4
of this study.
During the Red Scare Era, there were a number of labor
strikes that received considerable national attention,
namely the Seattle general strike, the Boston Police strike,
and the nationwide steel and coal strikes. In addition,
there was a series of bombing incidents in at least eight
different cities that targeted prominent political figures
including US Attorney General Palmer. The Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917 raised the public’s fear of revolution
and socio-economic instability (Poveda, 1990; Theoharis,
1999).
Between 1934 and 1945, World War II became the major
concern of the US administrations. In order to prevent the
manipulation of American communists and fascists by Nazi
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Germany and Soviet Russia, these groups became the focus of
security organizations.
The McCarthy Era of the early 1950s was characterized
by alarm over the influence of communism in the US. The
Russian occupation of Eastern Europe after WWII, the Cold
War, the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the North Korean
invasion of South Korea, and atomic espionage all signaled
the rise of Soviet expansionism (Poveda, 1990; Schmidt,
2000; Stephan, 2000).
The 1960’s are well known as a time of civil disorder
characterized by civil rights activism, anti-war
demonstrations, and a violent racist backlash. US
involvement in the Vietnam War greatly influenced this era.
During this time frame, there were over 300 arsons or
attempted arsons, and fourteen destructive bombings
throughout the nation. In 1968-1969, material damage caused
by incidents on college campuses alone reached a total of
12.5 million (Hearing Before the Civil Rights and
Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, 1974; Poveda, 1999).
In sum, within all these eras, the country experienced
intense disorder caused by both internal and international
events. This intense social unrest led to state reaction.
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Disclosure of Misuse and Reform in
Domestic Intelligence
The decade of the 1970’s is very important in the
history of the FBI. It was during this decade that the
misuse of the FBI came to light. The first incident on
record was uncovered by a break-in at the FBI’s Media office
in March 1971 in Pennsylvania, by a group that called itself
the “Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI”. During
this break-in, several FBI files were stolen and distributed
to the media, showing the misuse. The second important
incident was the disclosure of the FBI illegal break-ins by
President Nixon in 1973. Nixon said in response to questions
on the matter that the FBI break ins had taken place during
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. The third incident
was the 1975 release of FBI Director's “secret files,” a
mass of private information collected through the
investigation of several prominent and influential people.
The fourth incident on record was suit of the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP) in 1976. This party had sued the FBI in
1973. During the trial, the use of illegal intelligence
methods, including break-ins, were revealed (Poveda, 1990).
After these disclosures, a reform activity was started
to set standards for FBI intelligence investigations for the
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first time. In 1976, the Attorney General’s Guidelines for
FBI Domestic Security Investigations (Levi Guidelines) were
issued. These guidelines did away with domestic intelligence
replacing them with the more palatable task of “Domestic
Security Investigation.” Investigations were now required to
have specific and articulable facts that indicate a
violation of law before they may initiate a domestic
security investigation (Oseth, 1985; Elliff, 1979).
Additionally, the task of foreign intelligence was
given to a newly created Intelligence Division. Domestic
intelligence became the responsibility of another division,
namely the General Investigative Division, later was renamed
the Criminal Investigation Division in 1977 (Rosenfeld,
1999; Elliff, 1979).
To regulate the collection, maintenance, use and
dissemination of personal information by the government, the
Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted. The Freedom of Information
Act of 1966 was amended in 1974 to give citizens the right
to gain access to any information that federal agencies may
collect about them. These acts were passed with the belief
that citizens themselves were the protection against
unlawful investigations.
In the 1980s, concerns arose that the stricter
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limitations placed on FBI investigations might potentially
cripple the FBI’s ability to counter terrorist activities.
For example, the FBI had to disclose the identification of
its confidential informants in order to comply with the
Freedom of Information Act. This disclosure requirement, it
was believed, scared off key sources who now could not
remain anonymous. However, a counter argument states that
the decline in FBI domestic intelligence investigations
after the 1970’s was due to a simultaneous decline in number
of the incidents that required FBI response. Nevertheless,
the Reagan administration revised the Levi Guidelines in the
1980’s (Elliff, 1979).
The 1980’s
In 1983, “The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General
Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic
Security/Terrorism Investigations” (Smith Guidelines) were
issued (Electronic Privacy Information Center 1995). These
guidelines granted the FBI greater liberty to initiate
domestic security and terrorism investigations (Poveda,
1990). Namely, the Smith Guidelines provided that in order
for the FBI to initiate an investigation, it must now have a
“reasonable indication” that a federal law has been
violated, rather than the previous, harsher standard
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requiring “specific articulable facts.” Now the guidelines
allowed the initiation of an investigation “when the facts
or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more
persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of
furthering political or social goals wholly or in part
through activities that involve force or violence and a
violation of criminal laws.” The new standard is even lower
than the Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause (Banks
& Bowman, 2000).
Additionally, the use of the Freedom of Information Act
was limited against the security organizations in these
years. This practice is also argued to have removed one of
the external control mechanisms for intelligence
investigations (Charns, 1992).
Naturally, the lessening of investigative restrictions
gave rise to arguments. Critics of the new policy argued
innocent American citizens were more vulnerable to domestic
security investigations.
The FBI and Domestic Intelligence Today
In the 1990s, the fear of international and domestic
terrorism as a result of the Persian Gulf War led to
increased FBI counter-terrorist efforts (Charns, 1992).
Successful terrorist attacks during this time frame,
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including the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York
City in February 1993 and the bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 led to questions
about the adequacy of the FBI’s domestic intelligence
efforts (Poveda, 1999).
In 1993, the FBI National Security Division was
established. It was tasked with collecting intelligence and
carrying out counterintelligence measures related to
national security and international terrorism. Domestic
intelligence investigations were transferred to this
division from the Criminal Investigation Division. Until
1999, domestic intelligence as well as foreign
counterintelligence activities, were carried out by this
division (Rosenfeld, 1999).
In 1999, a new FBI Counterterrorism division was
founded and the FBI counterterrorism initiatives were
transferred from the National Security Division to this new
division. Upon this reorganization, the National Security
Division’s jurisdiction was limited to foreign
counterintelligence (Hedges, 1999).
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, a new plan
was formed to reunite the functions of counterterrorism and
counterintelligence, into one
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Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division. This was, in
fact, partly a wartime reorganization of the Justice
Department. It was also a response to severe congressional
criticism of the FBI’s mishandling of several high profile
cases as well as the misplacing of thousands of pages of
evidence in the Oklahoma City Bombing investigation.
Conclusion
Domestic intelligence involves the secret collection
and maintenance of information regarding possible national
security threats. The FBI’s domestic intelligence function
began as a response to fears that foreign immigrants, mostly
Eastern European in origin, presented a threat to
national security in the first decade of the 20th century.
During the World War I, FBI intelligence work focused on
alien immigrants to the US. These efforts were supported by
the enactment of two laws: The Sedition Act of 1918, and the
Immigration Act of 1918. However, because of the Red Scare
and the Teapot Dome Scandals, the Attorney General’s office
issued guidelines to stop non-intelligence investigations in
1924.
Intelligence work was resumed in 1934 before World War
II. In that year, the President ordered the FBI to
investigate whether American communists and fascists could
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be internal security threats, and whether these groups were
foreign directed. The Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 and the Alien Act of 1940 provided a legal basis for
these investigations.
In the Cold War era, FBI intelligence efforts started
to go beyond security related information gathering. The
primary rationale behind this deviation was to protect
national security.
The law and order crisis of the 1960’s is now infamous.
It is also a time of no fewer than five disruptive
counterintelligence operations that utilized illegal
techniques.
These illegal practices were discovered in the 1970’s,
and consequently intelligence reform was initiated. This
reform mainly intended to provide guidelines for the
initiation, limits and techniques of intelligence
operations. The first of these regulations were the 1976
Levi Guidelines. They required that specific and articulable
facts that a violation of federal law had occurred must be
present for domestic security investigations to be
initiated.
These standards were weakened by the Smith Guidelines
and later revisions. The FBI was steadily given broader
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guidelines and less restriction in order to combat
increasing national security threats. It must be noted,
however, that this broad autonomy is argued to have
increased the potential for misuse of domestic intelligence
as explained in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL MISUSE OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
Domestic intelligence is a process of information
gathering and record keeping about individuals or
organizations, who are thought to be dangerous to national
security. The FBI’s domestic intelligence initiative was
established to prevent the manipulation of domestic
political groups by foreign enemies. The FBI was associated
with counter-subversive, and counterterrorist activities in
an effort to provide the government with information
necessary for the preservation of national security and to
obtain preventive intelligence information for future use.
Any deviation from these initial functions constitutes the
misuse.
In this chapter, various forms of the political misuse
of domestic intelligence are explored, paying particular
attention to select sample cases in the eras that are
discussed in the previous chapter. However, while the second
chapter provides a brief overview of the roots of the FBI’s
domestic intelligence function, this chapter of the study
provides an in-depth analysis of the most well known
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incidents in these eras in an attempt to explore the
different forms of political misuse of domestic
intelligence.
The Forms of Political Misuse of Domestic
Intelligence
Politics can be defined as “deciding who gets what,
when, and how. It is an activity by which people try to get
more of whatever there is to get money, prestige, jobs,
respect and power” (Dye, 2002, p.1).
Based on this definition, politics can be said to
relate to all aspects of the redistribution of national
resources to the population. Political misuse of
intelligence then may be defined as an interference with the
normal flow of this redistribution process. For example,
influential government officials may order intelligence
organizations to obtain critical information about their
political opponents so that they can be easily neutralized
politically. On the other hand, intelligence can be used to
intimidate otherwise lawful citizens who hold political
views that go against the current status quo. For example,
in a dictatorship state, the party in power will attempt to
prevent the rise of any political party that is in favor of
the establishment of a democratic administration. It will
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put forth a negative image of this party and its members
through covert campaigns.
In sum, the political misuse of intelligence relates to
the use of intelligence to influence the redistribution of
national resources in favor of those who are in power.
Accordingly, the political misuse of the FBI’s domestic
intelligence is classified into one of two categories in the
literature. The first category relates to the information-
gathering function of intelligence to promote the political
interests of government officials, instead of promoting the
public good or ensuring domestic security. This activity is
referred to as the political use of intelligence. The Second
form consists of using the covert capabilities or
counterintelligence and counterterrorist functions of the
domestic intelligence agency to repress those who are lawful
but who challenge the status quo. This activity is referred
to as political counterintelligence or political
intelligence (Theoharis, 1978; Donner, 1980; Churchill &
Wall, 1990; Schmidt, 2000; Poveda, 1990; Morgan, 1980).
The political use of domestic intelligence represents
a deviation from legitimate domestic intelligence duties
with the intention of furthering the personal political
interests of political administrators. The political use of
41
intelligence may then be seen as one type of corruption.
On the other hand, political counterintelligence may be
associated with political prejudice and intolerance, and
used as a tool of oppression against those who are lawful
but who have challenging views.
The Political Use of Intelligence
The political use of intelligence involves gathering
critical information about, and political plans of, the
various political opponents of government officials. It also
involves the selective abuse of these secrets to further
political interests of these officials, essentially
neutralizing their opponents through threat of disclosure
(Theoharis, 1991; Oseth, 1985).
In order to effectively gather and store personal
information, the FBI must maintain a high level of secrecy.
This secretive nature, an indispensable part of intelligence
work, allowed, if not encouraged, political abuse. It was
seen as beneficial not only for the political administrators
but also for the FBI itself. The Bureau greatly needed
political support to expand its own power as an agency (US
Senate Select Committee, 1976, vol.2).
Influential politicians may use the FBI’s resources in
one of two ways. First they may take advantage of any FBI
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information already on-file by running “name checks”
(Theoharis, 1991). The Misuse of name-checks involves
searching FBI files for critical information on the subjects
and using this information against them unlawfully.
On the other hand, influential persons may initiate a
new domestic intelligence investigation to uncover private
information, as well as their political strategies, thus
illegally taking advantage of all available intelligence
techniques such as open sources, informant infiltration,
technical and physical surveillance, and the interception of
communication (Theoharis, 1991).
Although intelligence investigations may take advantage
of previously collected information about a target, they are
different from name checks in the sense that an intelligence
investigation involves obtaining information through a new
investigation that is undertaken solely at the direction of
the interested political figures.
The political use of domestic intelligence goes back to
the beginning of the 1920’s when the Bureau of
Investigation, the forerunner of the FBI, advised the
President on social conflicts. This task was firmly
established as a formal job description of the Bureau’s
Director in 1929. At this time, the Bureau was also ordered
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to carry out certain investigations requested by the White
House (Schmidt, 2000; Morgan, 1980).
1. The Misuse of Name-Checks
Senator Barry Goldwater was the Republican party’s
presidential candidate in 1964. In his election campaign,
Goldwater pledged to reduce increasing crime and social
disorder. He also criticized the Johnson Administration for
not being able to effectively combat crime (Rosch, 1985).
To neutralize these efforts, the FBI conducted a name
check and initiated an investigation into Goldwater’s
campaign staff to obtain critical information (Theoharis,
1991; O’Reilly, 1988; Powers, 1987).
Although name checks were performed at the request of
FBI higher-ups, they were also run by the Crime Records
Division of the FBI, as a routine matter of national
security, to keep the FBI Director informed regarding
prominent personalities such as Congressmen and other high
ranking public officials (Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations, 1975).
The most recent example of name check abuse is commonly
known as the “Filegate Scandal,” which occurred during the
Clinton Administration. This scandal involved allegations
that White House security officials acquired nine hundred
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confidential FBI files. Some of these files
were on the prominent political figures that had served in
the Bush and Reagan administrations. It is alleged that this
action intended to get critical information about the
subject people.
2. Misuse of Investigative Powers
One of the criticisms brought against the FBI is that
many prominent political figures became the target of
politically motivated, non-criminal investigations that
delved into their political beliefs and private lives
(Williams, 1981).
One of the earliest example of the political use of
intelligence occurred in 1920. Adversaries of the Assistant
Secretary of Labor dug up information to discredit him
because he was opposed to the deportation of immigrants who
were members of the Communist Party. In order to be able to
connect him to radicalism, the Bureau started an
investigation to acquire critical information on his
political background. However, these efforts backfired.
Instead of discrediting the Secretary, abusive use of the
Justice Department and the Bureau were revealed (Schmidt,
2000).
The Teapot Dome Scandal is another example of the
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political misuse of intelligence. It took place in 1923-
1924, when two influential US Senators began an
investigation of some questionable rental rates for several
oil reserves in Teapot Dome, WY, and Elk Hills, CA. The
investigation uncovered the possible bribery of the
Secretary of the Interior and the failure of the Attorney
General to start an investigation into this issue. In
response, the Bureau started its own investigation about the
persistent senators, and monitored them closely to uncover
any derogatory information about them. Their wires were
tapped, their mail was opened and their homes were entered
surreptitiously (Theoharis, 1999).
In November 1929, the Bureau was asked by the
Administration to investigate the Sentinels of the Republic,
organization which opposed the growth of the federal
government, and the Navy League, an organization that
lobbied for a big US Navy and opposed the arms reductions
(Schmidt, 2000).
The political use of the FBI expanded during World War
II when the Roosevelt administration came under heavy
domestic criticism (Theoharis, 1978; O’Reilly, 1982). The
House Special Committee to Investigate Un-American
Activities and Propaganda was established in 1934 to
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investigate domestic Nazi and Fascist groups. It became
another political target of the FBI after 1940 when it
criticized the Roosevelt Administration for not prosecuting
so-called subversives. To avoid possible negative fall-out,
the US Government is said to have used the FBI’s resources
to discredit this Committee. Beginning in July 1940, the FBI
focused its attention on the head of this Committee,
Representative Martin Dies of Texas, and informed the
Justice Department and the White House of his activities.
The FBI was also asked to investigate rumors that Dies’
father was pro-German during World War I, and that the
committee was infiltrated by Communists (Stephan, 2000;
Donner, 1980; Schmidt, 2000; O’Reilly, 1982).
During the investigations of the House Special
Committee, the Bureau did not hesitate to wiretap phones,
open mail, and break into the offices and homes of committee
members to gather information. However, during subsequent
congressional hearings, the illegal use of the Bureau was
disclosed and the Attorney General was forced to resign from
office. Also, the director of the Bureau was fired by the
new Attorney General (Theoharis, 1999).
In 1941, the FBI forwarded to the White House a broad
report on the actions of the US Government’s right-wing
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critics, namely the Christian Front and Mobilizers, the
American Destiny Party, the American National party, the
American Nationalist Party, and the America First Committee
(Theoharis, 1978).
During the Truman Administration, from 1945 to 1948,
the FBI surveilled a former Roosevelt White House assistant,
reporting his activities back to the White House (Theoharis,
1978). Later on, the White House ordered the FBI to collect
information on other White House employees. This order was
originally intended to uncover those who were leaking secret
information. However, it went beyond these intentions.
Wiretaps carried out under this order provided the White
House with information about the political plans of
prominent national figures who conversed with the employees
under surveillance (Theoharis, 1991).
During this period, the FBI regularly provided
information to the White House about critics of the
President’s administration. For example, the FBI informed
White House about a meeting of several newspaper
representatives in Chicago. The papers planned to publish a
series of articles exposing corrupt politicians, articles




The second form of intelligence abuse is associated
with misuse of the covert action or counterintelligence and
counterterrorist capabilities. These types of misuse are
known as political intelligence, political
counterintelligence or political covert actions.
As discussed earlier, counterintelligence involves all
activities that are intended to detect, lawfully counter and
neutralize the activities of foreign or hostile intelligence
organizations that may present a threat to national security
(Oseth, 1985; US Senate Select Committee, 1976, vol.1;
Ransom, 1970). Covert actions are designed to manipulate a
foreign nation’s interests by influencing the events and
politics of that nation in a clandestine way, i.e. without
revealing official involvement (Borosage, 1976).
Covert actions and counterintelligence are misused in
various ways depending on the goals of the person or office
that is misusing them. However, as a general rule, when they
are misused, it is to oppress otherwise lawful citizens who
wish to overturn the status quo (Theoharis, 1978; Donner,
1980; Churchill & Wall, 1990; Schmidt, 2000; Poveda, 1990;
Morgan, 1980). It is not the covert actions or
counterintelligence functions themselves that are
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criticized. Rather, it is the fact that these intelligence
tools are being wielded against non-violent domestic
political and social protest groups indiscriminately because
of their challenging ideologies (US Senate Select Committee,
1976, vol.2).
The focus of the FBI’s political counterintelligence
activities changed overtime in response to changing
perceptions of what constitutes a security threat. During
World War I, the focus was on communist immigrants who were
members of radical labor unions. During and after World War
II, American communists and fascists were targeted. In the
1960’s, civil rights activists, student anti-war
demonstrators and white hate groups were targeted.
1. World War I and Red Scare Era (1917-1921)
The most prominent example of political intelligence in
this period is found in the Palmer Raids of 1919 and 1920.
In these raids, the Bureau of Investigations, a forerunner
of the FBI, indiscriminately arrested over 10,000 immigrants
in 33 cities, claiming that they posed an internal security
threat because they were members of the Communist and
Communist Labor Parties.
Critics of the Palmer Raids argued that the Bureau
lacked any authority in immigration matters. Additionally,
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arrests were based solely on intelligence information
allegedly showing them as being members of the Communist
Party, not on any evidence of actual participation in
violence, espionage or sabotage. It is also argued that the
Bureau interfered with the trial process by convincing
immigration authorities to set bails high enough to keep the
immigrants in custody as long as possible (Poveda, 1990;
Williams, 1981).
A second criticism of the Red Scare Era is the
widespread use of illegal intelligence techniques. Letters
and telegrams were intercepted, break-ins were conducted,
buggings were carried out without warrants. Bureau agents
sometimes made their presence felt in public meetings so
that their targets were well aware of the fact that they
were under surveillance. Additionally, agents sometimes
directly interviewed suspected radicals thereby implying
that they were under investigation (Schmidt, 2000).
2. The Cold War and The Era of McCarthyism (1948-1955)
This era takes its name from Joseph McCarthy, a US
Senator from Wisconsin, who conducted an all-out political
crusade against communism from 1949 to 1953. It is a well-
known fact that FBI intelligence activities went beyond
information gathering in this era. It carried out systematic
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counterpropaganda campaigns against its targets, mainly US
citizens who were suspected members of the Communist Party
(Keller, 1989).
The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC)
hearings in 1949-50, made public the FBI information on the
American Communists. The HUAC’s activities were made public
in nationally televised hearings that resulted in the
blacklisting or incarceration of many prominent Hollywood
actors and artisans. The HUAC hearings were also argued to
reduce the number of Communist Party members from 40,000 to
12,000 (Churchill & Wall, 1990).
During this era, the FBI tried to disgrace and
discredit many highly visible public figures by secretly
releasing derogatory information about them to the media,
governmental agencies, civic organizations, and members of
congress. These programs were called Mass Media Campaigns.
(Redden, 2000; Schmidt, 2000; Theoharis, 1999, 1991).
In 1951, the FBI instituted a secret liaison program
with the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS). FBI
officials processed "name check" requests submitted by the
SISS and provided background information on public and
private organizations.
Between 1953 and 1954, the Senate Permanent
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Investigations Subcommittee hearings were chaired by
McCarthy. Senator McCarthy was privy to the FBI’s
counterpropaganda campaign. As a right wing conservative and
a friend to Herbert Hoover, he was given a list of political
figures (perhaps compiled from the SISS’s name checks) who
were suspected to have communist ties or be otherwise
engaged in “Un-American” activities. His fervent and very
public attacks on alleged communists have since been dubbed
“McCarthyism.” These attacks ended the career of many
prominent so-called left-wing politicians, including perhaps
even President Truman (Redden, 2000; Schmidt, 2000;
Theoharis, 1999, 1991).
In sum, in this era there arose a general hysteria that
the communists had taken over the entertainment industry,
the government, and even military. Because of this hysteria,
many people were suspected of being a communist due to their
associations. They were automatically seen as national
security threats. Solely relying on intelligence
information, many people were harassed for being agents of
the enemy. The open harassment of these people arguably




In 1951, another information-dissemination program,
known as the Responsibilities Program, was initiated. The
purpose of this program was to inform state governors and
civic leaders regarding suspected subversives employed in
state agencies, including public or private schools
(Theoharis, 1999).
Civic leaders and organizations, employers and
landlords, credit bureaus and even interested businesses had
access to the targeted suspect’s private information. In
fact, family members, church groups, and anyone who had
economic relations with the suspect could potentially be
given this information (Hearing Before the Civil and
Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, 1974).
Based on this information, government offices went out
of their way to create problems for the individual on the
grounds that these problems might detract him or her from
alleged subversive activities (the Select Committee, 1975;
Donner, 1980). For example, the Internal Revenue Service
targeted for audit and special treatment the returns of
thousands of individuals because of their suspected
political activities (Hudson, 2001).
The use of “file” information against individuals was
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highly supported by the Crime Records Office, the FBI’s top
executives, and the field offices that were trained to work
with the local media to develop anti-communist public
opinion (Donner, 1980; Theoharis, 1999; Schmidt, 2000;
Powers, 1987). This system of counterpropagandizing was set
in motion to influence the political choices and social
values of citizens by promoting a negative image of the
target group (Charns, 1992). One expected result of this
negative image building was to drive the potential recruits
away, and thereby reduce the size of the movement (Marx
1979). Another reason for this propagandist activity was to
gain public support and prevent any opposition in the fight
against subversion (Powers, 1987).
However, it is argued these initiatives of the FBI had
no law enforcement purpose and information was spread well
beyond the need to know from a law enforcement standpoint
(Theoharis, 1999). Also, having critical information on
files often automatically criminalized the target
individuals (Potter, 1998). Furthermore, those who were
subject to this filing of political or personal information,
permanently had a “record” of his or her political life that
could never be changed (Donner, 1980).
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3. Law and Order Crisis of the 1960s
This era is well known as a period of internal unrest
due to actions of civil rights movements, white hate groups,
student anti-war activists, and the assassinations of very
prominent people, including President John F. Kennedy and
civil Rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
In response to the public disorder of the time, the FBI
conducted five counterintelligence programs (COINTELPRO)
against domestic targets between 1956-1971 (Donner, 1980;
Davis, 1997). It has since run into much criticism for these
programs.
The COINTELPRO’s were directed at disrupting and
preventing the long-range growth of the domestic political
or protest organizations that were perceived to be
threatening to domestic security. Among these were the
Communist Party, U.S.A (1956-1971); the Socialist Workers
Party (1961-1970); the White Hate Groups (1964-1971); the
Black Extremists (1967-1971); and the New Left (1968-1971)
(Hearings Before the Select Committee, 1975; Jeffreys, 1995;
Donner, 1980).
The Communist Party USA counterintelligence program was
designed to “bring the Communist Party and its leaders into
disrepute before the American public, and cause confusion
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and dissatisfaction among rank and file members” (Hearings
Before the Select Committee, 1975).
The Socialist Workers Party counterintelligence program
began in October 1961. Although this program originally
targeted the Socialist Workers Party, it eventually spread
its focus to other organizations that co-sponsored events
with this party. These events included, for example, several
peace marches during the Vietnam War (Hearings Before the
Select Committee, 1975; Redden, 2000).
The White Hate Groups’ counterintelligence program was
authorized in September of 1964. This program grew out of
the violently disruptive and harassing activities of these
groups in their attempt to undermine the civil rights
movement. The activities of these groups included
“lynchings, burnings, bombings, and similarly violent
activities” (Hearings Before the Select Committee, 1975;
Hearing Before the Civil and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee, 1974, p.11).
The Black Extremists counterintelligence program was
launched in August of 1967. It targeted a wide range of
black organizations, from the militant Black Panther Party
to non-violent Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC) as well as most of the African-American student
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organizations found on college campuses (Redden, 2000). The
aim of this program was to “expose, disrupt, misdirect,
discredit, or otherwise neutralize” the Black Nationalist
movement. Additionally, this program tried to prevent the
rise of a leader who might unify and electrify these
elements, tried to keep the groups from gaining
respectability, and attempted to prevent the growth of these
groups among youth (Hearings Before the Select Committee,
1975).
The New Left counterintelligence program was launched
in May, 1968, in reaction to student protests against the
Vietnam War. The aim of this program was to expose, disrupt,
misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities
of this group and persons connected to it (Hearings Before
the Select Committee, 1975).
The decade of the 1960’s is also known as the “lawless
years” of the FBI. During this period, it is argued that the
FBI’s domestic intelligence methods abandoned entirely the
legal pathways to justice. Instead, the FBI used clearly
illegal techniques to disrupt or neutralize targeted
individuals and groups. These targets were thought to
present a danger to national security because they held
ideas that challenged the existing acceptable political
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views (Davis, 1997, Powers, 1987; Morgan, 1980; Keller,
1989).
These COINTELPRO’s were harshly criticized for
preventing political diversity in the US. Their sole purpose
was to destroy or neutralize these movements politically
rather than investigate on-going criminal activities
(Churchill & Wall, 1990).
The influences of the 1960’s were unique in that in
previous Eras, it was suspected that foreign governments
were influencing local groups. Now, for the first time,
political intelligence investigations were initiated against
wholly domestic political groups (Elliff, 1979).
The Critics of Counterintelligence Programs
The Critics of FBI counterintelligence programs focus
on two major issues: the targets and purposes of the
operations, and the intelligence methods employed (Keller,
1989; Morgan, 1980).
a. The Targets and Purposes of FBI Operations
FBI counterintelligence activities were started for
the purpose of preventing “foreign influence and
control” on domestic political groups (Hearing Before the
Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, 1974). This is
a perfectly legitimate area for counterintelligence,
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centered on the detection and prevention of the hostile
activities of foreign intelligence (Morgan, 1980).
After the 1950’s, however, FBI programs are widely
criticized for taking up the practice of disrupting and
discrediting non-violent domestic political and protest
groups, simply because of ideological differences, even
though these groups were neither suspected nor convicted of
any crime nor any connection to a foreign power (Powers,
1987; Donner, 1980; Morgan, 1980).
In the search for potentially violent or foreign
directed protest activities, law-abiding citizens were
targeted for investigations of their private lives and
personal beliefs (Elliff, 1979).
For example, The Black Nationalist program included the
nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., and black student organizations.
The Communist Party USA counterintelligence program not only
covered Party members, it also investigated sponsors of the
National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American
Activities Committee as well as civil rights leaders who
were supposedly influenced by communists (US Senate Select
Committee, 1976, vol.3; Redden, 2000; Hudson, 2001).
Some critics argue that the CP-USA was on the decline
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after 1945 and by the 1950’s it was not an organization that
was capable of espionage or subversion. It was already
disabled. Additionally, counterintelligence was extended to
targets who were not even communists, including groups that
had no connection whatsoever to a foreign power (Morgan,
1980; Keller, 1989).
The choice of counterintelligence targets was slanted,
with hostility and prejudice toward those who challenged the
predominant conservative political ideology (Donner, 1980;
Williams, 1981). These leftist elements were thought to be
easy targets for foreign influence (Morgan, 1980).
Many Americans were considered dangerous just because
of their controversial views, views, which fell outside of
conventional politics (Churchill & Wall, 1990; Schmidt,
2000; Davis, 1997). From the perspective of those Americans,
FBI counterintelligence was seen as an unwarranted violation
of their First Amendment rights of free speech and free
association (Elliff, 1979).
Political counterintelligence activities aim to
incapacitate political or social protest groups that are
seen to be potentially subversive by reducing their ability
to function effectively or to recruit new members (Schmidt,
2000; Jeffreys, 1995; Theoharis, 1978). Political
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counterintelligence programs went beyond mere surveillance,
and they did not intend the prosecution of an illegal act.
Rather, they intended to “disrupt, misdirect or neutralize
the target movements or groups” (Churchill & Wall, 1990,
p.39; Keller, 1989, p.158). These programs put the FBI into
a position in which it became at the same time policeman,
prosecutor, judge, and jury (Hearing Before the Civil Rights
and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, 1974).
Since COINTELPRO targets were US citizens rather than
foreign intelligence agents, they were more accurately
described as covert actions intended to influence political
choices and social values (Charns, 1992).
b. Counterintelligence Techniques
One of the most critical points regarding these
programs is that they employed wartime intelligence methods
against domestic targets. Collecting and aggressively using
information to harass and discredit individuals and groups
is a wartime propaganda tactic that has often been used to
effectively unify the controlling group and its allies
against a common enemy (Keller, 1989; Bayley, 1985; Morgan,
1980; Hearing Before the Civil and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee, 1974).
The controlling group furthers its own interests by
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painting a terrible picture of its adversary. For example,
in an FBI memorandum, the field offices were directed to
conduct the following activities against the anti-war
activists:
1-prepare leaflets using the most obnoxious
pictures of New Left leaders at various
universities
2-instigate personal conflicts or animosities
between new left leaders
3-create the impression that leaders are
informants for the Bureau or other law
enforcement agencies (the snitch jacket
technique)
4-send articles from student or “underground”
newspapers which show depravity “use of
narcotics and free sex” of new left leaders
to university officials, donors, legislators,
and parents
5-have members arrested on marijuana charges
6-send anonymous letters about a student’s
activities to parents, neighbors, and the
parents’ employers
7-send anonymous letters about New Left
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faculty members (signed “a concerned”
alumni)
8-use “cooperative” press contacts
9-exploit the hostility between new left and
old left groups
10-disrupt new left coffee houses near
military bases, which are attempting to
influence members of the armed forces
11-use cartoons, photographs, and anonymous
letters to ridicule the New Left
12-use misinformation to confuse and disrupt
new left activities, for example, notify
members that events have been called off (US
Senate Select Committee, 1976, vol.2, p.80).
Information on groups such as the New Left was
collected through the use of intelligence techniques such as
informant infiltration, mail openings, physical surveillance
(direct observation of subjects) and technical surveillance,
wiretapping, bugging, and open sources like newspapers, and
public meetings (Marx, 1979; Buranelli & Buranelli, 1982;
Stephan, 2000).
It is criticized that little or no attention was paid
to the legality of the intelligence techniques employed in
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counterintelligence programs. Consequently, from 1955 to
1978, the FBI ran 930,000 surveillance cases. Between 1940
and 1970, it conducted 13,500 illegal buggings, and 7,500
illegal break-ins (Schmidt, 2000). It conducted
approximately 58,000 illegal mail openings between 1958 and
1974 (Churchill & Wall, 1990), and it carried out at least
238 burglaries from 1942 until 1968 (Donner, 1980).
4. The 1980s
In the 1980’s, the most important example of the abuse
of domestic intelligence can be seen in the FBI’s
investigation of the Committee in Solidarity with the People
of El Salvador (CISPES). This investigation was initiated in
1981-1982 based on the suspicion that CISPES was an agent of
a foreign government. Since this allegation could not be
proved, the FBI stopped its investigation. However, the
investigation was reopened in 1983 labeling the group as
either a foreign counterintelligence operation or an
international terrorist group. This investigation was
stopped in 1985, and no criminal charges were brought
against CISPES or any of its members. One possible thought
is that the investigation was a political, rather than a
criminal, investigation, since this organization was against
the Reagan administration’s foreign policy on El Salvador.
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This incident proves that it is always possible for the FBI
to increase its domestic intelligence activities by claiming
that they are providing foreign counterintelligence and
combating international terrorism. This shift permits the
FBI to use a different set of investigative guidelines, a
set that is much less restrictive and more classified
(Hudson, 2001; Rosenfeld, 1999; Poveda, 1990).
Conclusion
The political misuse of domestic intelligence refers to
use of intelligence in an effort to influence the flow of
redistribution of national sources in favor of those who are
in the power.
There are two types of political misuse of
intelligence. Political use of intelligence refers to the
use of intelligence to promote the political interests of
high-ranking government officials. On the other hand,
political intelligence/counterintelligence refers to the
repression of lawful groups that challenge the status quo.
The political use of intelligence can either be based
on previously obtained intelligence information, or on new
intelligence investigations that are launched for the
specific purpose of satisfying the high-ranking government
officials.
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The targets of FBI political intelligence have changed
throughout history based on changes in threats to the US. In
the 1920’s, alien immigrant communists who were members of
radical labor unions were targeted. During and after World
War II, American communists and fascists were focused on.
The 1960s is well known for its five counterintelligence
operations conducted against the US Communist Party,
Socialist Workers Party, Black Extremists, and White Hate
Groups.
In the 1980s, the most important incident was the FBI
actions against the Committee in Solidarity with the People
of El Salvador (CISPES).
As accepted by many scholars, effective use of domestic
intelligence relies on prevention of its misuse. It is
essential that its consequences and theoretical explanations
be known before a prevention mechanism is recommended.
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CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE MISUSE
Domestic intelligence is comprised of gathering and
maintaining information about individuals or organizations
who are thought to be dangerous to national security. This
function is an important tool that secures a nation’s
future. However, there is always the potential for the
misuse of domestic intelligence.
In the current literature available on domestic
intelligence, there are predominantly two categories of
misuse. First, the political use of intelligence relates to
the use of information gathering function of intelligence to
promote the partisan interests of political administrators,
instead of preserving domestic security and the public good.
The second form of misuse is associated with the misuse of
covert action or the counterintelligence and
counterterrorist capabilities of the intelligence
organization. That is, domestic intelligence may aim at, or
result in, the repression of lawful people who have
political views that challenge the status quo. This type of
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activity is referred to as political counterintelligence or
political intelligence (Schmidt, 2000; Churchill & Wall,
1990; Poveda, 1990; Donner, 1980; Morgan, 1980; Theoharis,
1978).
In this section of the study, the causes and
consequences of misuse of domestic intelligence will be
examined.
Theoretical Explanations
Political Use of Domestic Intelligence
The political use of domestic intelligence refers to
the use of intelligence for private gains. In essence, it is
a version of corruption. A closer look at the term
“corruption” is helpful in understanding the motivations
behind the political use of domestic intelligence.
There are various definitions for corruption. The
public office school of thought considers corruption to be a
deviation from legal obligations and public duty for private
gain. On the other hand, from a market system perspective,
corruption is seen as a behavior undertaken by public
officials to maximize their own benefit. Public interest
scholars view corruption as a disloyalty to public interest.
While corrupted officials may be responsible for the
abuse of domestic intelligence, what causes these officials
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to become corrupt? The economic theory of corruption argues
that corruption originates from rapid social and economic
changes. These changes generate new dominant groups that
make new demands on the government. If these demands cannot
be satisfied in legitimate ways, dominant group leaders may
tend to use different corrupt tactics such as bribery, to
get what they want (Meier & Holbrook, 1992).
On the other hand, the sociological theory of
unfulfilled needs argues that corruption arises as an
alternative way of expanding personal powers, privileges,
and interests (Benson, 1978).
When considering these two theories, the sociological
theory of unfulfilled needs can be best applied to the
misuse of domestic intelligence. The main rationale behind
the misuse of domestic intelligence was the expansion of the
personal powers of the political administrators
illegitimately. When they could find no legitimate methods
to overcome those who opposed them, they turned to
illegitimate means.
It must be noted here that in order for a public
official to tend toward corruption, he or she must believe
that the potential benefits of corruption exceed its
potential costs (Meier & Holbrook, 1992).
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Based on these theoretical explanations, the misuse of
FBI domestic intelligence can be said to have begun when the
partisan political aims of governmental higher-ups sought to
secure their interests by investigating the strategies of
their opponents and otherwise obtaining critical information
about them through the illegitimate use of the FBI.
The potential cost of the misuse of domestic
intelligence was never thought to be more than its benefits
simply because secrecy prevented disclosure. Only if the
public figure were caught would the cost of corruption be
higher than the benefits, and the very power and influence
that put that public figure in a position to be able to
wield the FBI’s resources could be used to protect him or
her from discovery. For example, it was not only until the
Watergate Scandal of 1972 that the American public became
aware of the misuse of intelligence by the Presidency.
Watergate involved Nixon’s attempts to collect
political intelligence on the Democratic Party. He wanted to
learn the Party’s campaign strategy for the 1972
presidential election. Five men were sent to break into the
Democratic Party Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel,
including the security director for the President’s re-
election campaign. The five were arrested. Once President
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Nixon’s involvement was uncovered, he was forced to resign
from office or face impeachment (Williams, 1998; Poveda,
1990).
Political Counterintelligence
The second form of the misuse of domestic intelligence,
political counterintelligence is explained by “threat
theory.” Threat theory states that political
counterintelligence operations were conducted in response to
changing domestic threats (Poveda, 1990; Morgan, 1980).
Threat Theory
Threat theory argues that those who challenge the
socio-economic status quo are seen as threats to the
existence of the state. When political authorities confront
these threats, they frequently use repression as a means to
control or eliminate them (Poe, Tate, Keith, & Lanier, 2000;
Davenport, 2000; Mahoney-Norris, 2000). These authorities
may tend to use state power in a way that goes beyond
constitutional limits. This is basically because national
security is given priority over individual rights (Fielding,
1991; Poveda, 1990).
It is argued that the US response directly after World
War II to perceived international and domestic threats
resulted in a “National Security State.” The possible growth
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of communism, especially after the establishment of
communist governments in Eastern Europe, China, and North
Korea kept Americans in fear of revolution, economic
instability, and a military dominance of the enemy in the
world. The creation of a national security state was a
reaction to these fears. It was seen as essential to protect
the US and its interests (Hudson, 2001, p.232, 237).
Although a state of national security may be necessary
for survival in a hostile world, this type of militant rule
presents many negative consequences. Essentially, three
basic rules of law are overlooked in a national security
state:
“1-The absence of arbitrary power;
2-The subjugation of the State and its officers to the
ordinary law, and
3-The recognition of basic principles superior to the
State itself” (Raskin, 1976, p.199).
National security states need subjective power. That
is, power in the national security state does not have to be
used in accordance with the public will. Since protection of
the state is the first priority, administrators in a
national security state assume more power, quickly deciding
what is good and what is not on behalf of the public. They
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may even determine which political activities are
acceptable, punish those activities that are not acceptable,
and even restrict people from merely associating with those
who hold unfavorable or dissenting views. The national
security system is also intended to protect the state from
the “enemy within:” The COINTELPRO programs of 1956-1971 are
good examples of how well the state protects itself from
internal enemies. As stated earlier, the FBI employed a
variety of techniques to disrupt or neutralize those who had
unfavorable or challenging political views (Raskin, 1976,
p.200).
It has been argued that corrupt behavior within
national agencies takes its roots from the fact that these
agencies consider themselves to be “above the law.” They
assume that they have the right to limit individual rights
and freedoms in the interest of protecting national security
(Schneider, 1996; Raskin, 1976; Hearing Before the Civil and
Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, 1974, p.3).
This “above the law” attitude was clearly stated by top
FBI officials when they testified before the Senate Select
Committee. These officials argued “the FBI had acted on the
assumption that they could disregard the normal legal rights
of domestic groups because their work was so important to
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national security that they were not governed by legal and
constitutional standards” (Elliff, 1979, p.6).
This approach created a common tendency that
intelligence was immune from some prohibitions applicable to
other governmental activities, and activities were hid
behind secrecy (US Senate Select Committee, 1976, vol.2).
Contributing Factors
According to the sociological theory of unfulfilled
needs, political use of domestic intelligence is one form of
corruption, which means on illegitimate use of governmental
powers for private gain. On the other hand, according to the
Threat Theory “Political counterintelligence” is
illegitimate use of state power against those who are lawful
but who hold political views that go against the status quo.
Being illegitimate, political counterintelligence, as
well as political use of intelligence, cannot be openly
carried out in a democratic state. However, there are
certain characteristics that are particular to intelligence
organizations that enable the agency to behave
illegitimately. Where the FBI is concerned, they are,
organizational autonomy, lack of clear legal restrictions,
ineffective oversight, and excessive secrecy, and second,
the subculture of the FBI. It must be noted that these
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factors are not exclusive factors, and they overlap. For
example, although it is a separately evaluated, the lack of
clear legal restrictions also contributes to the
organizational autonomy.
All of these factors, in fact, contributed the misuse
by giving the FBI broader organizational discretion on the
focus, limits, and methods of domestic intelligence, which
has to be limited for prevention of the misuse.
1. Organizational Autonomy
Until 1939, FBI intelligence investigations were
conducted solely at the State Department’s request, a
stipulation defined by a 1916 statute. This system
established an external control over the FBI. State
Department officials decided who was to be made a target,
when they would be targeted, and how long the investigation
would last (Theoharis, 1999; Schmidt, 2000).
However, in 1939, a presidential order terminated this
system. This order enabled FBI officials to independently
control investigations. It also ensured that FBI officials,
based on their own criteria, would determine the scope and
purpose of FBI investigations (Theoharis, 1999; Poveda,
1990).
In 1967, attempting to tap the power of FBI officials,
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the Attorney General created the Interdivisional
Intelligence Unit (IDIU) to coordinate intelligence
collected in the course of investigating the civil disorders
of the time. However, the first priority of IDIU was to
obtain intelligence. In the end, no efforts were made to
create standards or guidelines for conducting intelligence
activities (US Senate Select Committee, 1976, vol.2).
In 1970, the Huston Plan was another effort to
establish an external control on FBI intelligence
activities. This plan was formally known as the “Domestic
Intelligence Gathering Plan.” This plan, however, was aimed
at not only coordinating intelligence activities, but also
at loosening limits on surveillance techniques, allowing for
the expansion of intensive surveillance on antiwar and civil
rights activities. This was not performed due to
legal concerns expressed by the Attorney General.
Shortly after the termination of the Huston Plan, the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee was established within the
Justice Department. However, it too did not exercise
supervision over intelligence activities. Rather, it focused
on the evaluation of intelligence information (Dupree, 1993;
Charns, 1992; Theoharis, 1978; US Senate Select Committee,
1976, vol.2).
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Organizational autonomy of the FBI was also limited
with the Attorney General Guidelines after the 1970s. These
guidelines are discussed later in this chapter.
2. Ineffective Executive Oversight
One of the most significant factors that contributed to
the misuse of the FBI was the lack of effective executive
oversight.
It is argued until the 1980s, Presidents tended to
contact directly the FBI director bypassing entirely the
Attorney General. President Roosevelt, for example,
authorized the FBI to investigate subversive activities in
1936, by directly contacting the FBI director. During the
Roosevelt Administration, the White House also directly
contacted the FBI Director to give him the names of citizens
who sent telegrams to the White House to protest the
policies of the administration (Theoharis, 1999).
The practice of providing political intelligence to
White House Administrators arguably increased further this
FBI independence from executive oversight (Bernstein, 1976).
In addition, the FBI Directors were generally close to
Presidential Administrations, and established a friendship
with the US presidents (Donner, 1980).
It is argued that the practice of providing the
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President with intelligence gave the FBI immunity from
executive oversight. For example, the Justice Department’s
Internal Security Division was in charge of overseeing FBI
activities, but it generally failed to do so (Donner, 1980;
Hearings Before the Select Committee, 1975; Theoharis, 1978;
Powers, 1987; Schmidt, 2000). This was because the FBI
Director’s authorization came directly from the President
(Elliff, 1979).
As a result of this lack of executive oversight, the
FBI, even when clearly banned from doing something, could
easily circumvent any red tape. For example, the Custodial
Index Program was ordered to be discontinued by the Attorney
General in 1943. This program used FBI resources to compile
a list of “dangerous” persons who would be taken into
custody in case of war.
Even though this program had no authorization, the
Bureau continued it. A month after the Attorney General’s
order, the “Security Index,” as it now was called, enabled
FBI agents to continue "to investigate dangerous and
potentially dangerous" citizens and aliens and to compile a
list of their names (Theoharis, 1999; Theoharis, 1978,
p.43).
The FBI overcame another limitation in 1976 when it was
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ordered to reduce the number of domestic security informants
that it used. To overcome this obstacle, instead of
dismissing some of its informants, the FBI simply
reclassified its domestic security informants as “foreign
counterintelligence” personnel (Theoharis, 1978).
3. Unclear Legal Restrictions
It is argued that although the FBI was empowered to
carry out domestic intelligence activities and permitted to
use a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques (such
as wiretaps, buggings, informant infiltration, etc.) the
scope and the limits of this authority were never adequately
defined until 1976 (Elliff, 1979, 1971; US Senate Select
Committee, 1976, vol.2).
The lack of clear standards for the initiation,
continuation and ceasing of intelligence investigations
allowed, if not encouraged, misuse. The FBI was granted
near-absolute discretionary power to start an intelligence
investigation; it needed only to identify a target as
“subversive” or “related to an organization supposedly
advocating the overthrow of the government” in order to
initiate an intelligence operation (Hudson, 2001, p.252).
It is argued that due to lack of legal limitations, the
FBI used a “vacuum cleaner approach” in intelligence
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collection. That is, they gathered all available information
about groups and individuals, including their lawful
political activity even though there was no indication of
criminal conduct or subversion. This practice continued
until 1974 when the Privacy Act was passed (Kessler, 1993;
US Senate Select Committee, 1976, vol.2).
The absence of clear standards for intelligence
investigations led to an ever-increasing number of
investigations on law-abiding citizens and lawful domestic
groups. Among these groups were the Women’s Liberation
Movement, the Conservative Christian Front and the Christian
Mobilizers of Father Coughlin, and many university, church
and political groups opposed to the Vietnam War (US Senate
Select Committee, 1976, vol.2).
In 1976, for the first time, the limits of intelligence
agencies were officially outlined by the Attorney General’s
Guidelines (Oseth, 1985; Elliff, 1979). The Attorney
General’s Guidelines for FBI Domestic Security
Investigations (Levi Guidelines of 1976) renamed domestic
intelligence work, dubbing it “Domestic Security
Investigations.” The initiation of a domestic security
investigation now required a violent act that could be
related to domestic or international terrorism. These
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Guidelines categorized domestic security investigations into
three types: preliminary, limited, or full investigations.
The intelligence methods that can be applied in each of
these types were clearly defined (Oseth, 1985; Elliff,
1979).
Additionally, foreign intelligence was given to the
newly created Intelligence Division, and domestic
intelligence was transferred to the General Investigative
Division (GID). The GID was renamed the Criminal
Investigation Division in 1977 (Elliff, 1979; Rosenfeld,
1999). However, after this period, the subdivision of
intelligence investigations based on the whether the threat
was domestic or international increased the potential for
the misuse of intelligence. International terrorism and
foreign counterintelligence investigations allowed the FBI
much greater freedom in the use of intrusive investigative
techniques, including warrantless searches. Furthermore, the
investigation of suspected terrorists need not be preceded
by criminal activity. Therefore, by labeling domestic terror
as “international” the FBI could extend its investigative
powers against the domestic targets (Poveda, 1990).
The Levi Guidelines were revised in March 1983 with the
Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes,
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Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism
Investigations” (Smith Guidelines) (Electronic Privacy
Information Center, 1995; Elliff, 1979). These guidelines
granted the FBI greater liberty to initiate domestic
security and terrorism investigations (Poveda, 1990).
The Levi Guidelines linked the initiation of a domestic
security investigation to specific and articulable facts
that indicated the violation of federal law. The Smith
Guidelines lowered this standard to “reasonable indication”
that a federal law had been broken. That is, the Smith
Guidelines allowed the initiation of an investigation “when
the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or
more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of
furthering political or social goals wholly or in part
through activities that involve force or violence and a
violation of criminal laws” (Banks & Bowman, 2000).
Additionally, while the Levi guidelines had defined
three types of domestic security investigations and limited
the techniques for each type of investigation, the Smith
guidelines defined the two stages of investigations (Primary
inquiry and investigations) and loosened the restrictions on
the use of intelligence techniques. For example, while
informant infiltration was not allowed during a preliminary
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investigation under the Levi Guidelines (Preliminary,
limited, full investigations), the Smith guidelines approved
the use informants even in the early stages of an
investigation (Primary inquiry).
These guidelines are still in force with minor
revisions today.
4. The Subculture of the FBI
As with all law enforcement agencies, it is argued that
the personal ideologies of FBI officials became
institutionalized, thereby affecting the FBI’s activities.
For example, in the Red Scare Era of 1917-1920, most Bureau
and Justice Department officials were either lawyers or
persons who came from very successful positions which
usually produce conservatism. Most officials were personally
devoted to the economic and political status quo and held
“conservative ideas and values” (Schmidt, 2000, p.86, 365).
In the 1950s, the FBI agents were mostly white. By the
end of 1962, there were only ten black agents (Powers,
1987). It was also seen that during the 1960’s, being an
Irish Catholic was a “plus” for being an FBI agent.
The FBI’s conservative background arguably influenced
the official approach that the FBI took towards alleged
subversive matters and provided justification for the
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illegal intelligence techniques against those who held
political views that challenged the current order. That is,
most FBI officials considered leftist social movements to be
primary challenges to the authority of the existing social
system. These movements were perceived to be the result of
foreign influence and contrary to the American way of life.
Therefore, the radical ideas were considered “poisonous
theories” and “alien filth” (Schmidt, 2000, p.87-89).
5. Secrecy
In intelligence work, secrecy is an operational
necessity. It allows for the protection of confidentiality
and prevents the exposure and subsequent failure of an
operation. Because of its need for secrecy, the intelligence
industry is isolated from its outer environment. The outward
flow of information is heavily restricted to keep
undesirables from learning about intelligence activities
(Schmidt, 2000; Gill, 1998; Donner, 1980).
While secrecy does serve to protect legitimate
intelligence interests, it may also lead to inadequate
accountability and oversight. Secrecy makes it possible for
illegitimate activities to go undetected. It also enables
intelligence resources to be used for harmful ends (Gill,
1998; Marx, 1988; Donner, 1980; US Senate Select Committee,
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1976, vol.1).
For the FBI, secrecy had an additional dimension until
the 1970s. The FBI formulated a separate filing system in
1940, outside the regular filing system, to keep track of
its illegitimate activities. By hiding all evidence that it
had broken the law, the FBI could deny any wrong-doing while
still keeping records of its activities (Charns, 1992). For
example, it is argued that FBI Director Hoover kept secret
files in his private office that contained damaging
information on important personalities (including
presidents, and congressmen) and on those who simply opposed
the FBI or his leadership of the Bureau (Theoharis, 1978;
Elliff, 1979).
It must be noted that whatever the underlying reasons
may be, misuse of domestic intelligence breeds two types of
unwanted consequences that should be addressed.
The Consequences of Misuse
The misuse of domestic intelligence has two unwanted
consequences that are related to public administration and
public relations. First, the public loses its trust in the
government and in intelligence agencies when it discovers a
misuse of domestic intelligence. Secondly, the misuse of
domestic intelligence may contribute to social polarization
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in the community.
Loss of Public Trust
The disclosure of illegal activities carried out by the
government, particularly by intelligence agencies like the
FBI, damages public trust in these institutions. Previously,
the American people perceived these agencies as truthful and
incorruptible. However, after the illegitimate activities
were disclosed, the number of US citizens who had “highly
favorable" attitude towards the FBI fell from 84 percent in
1965 to 37 percent in 1975 (Olmsted, 1996, p.16-17; Donner,
1980, p.80; Elliff, 1979, p.3).
Also, erosion of public trust threatens the FBI’s
ability to perform its mission. Citizens who distrust the
FBI may be less likely to report a criminal activity. The
testimony of FBI witnesses may be seen as untrustworthy by
judiciary (Hearing on “Oversight: Restoring Confidence in
the FBI, 2001).
Indeed, law enforcement organizations need
information about the crimes and criminals from the public
to enhance their crime-fighting capability (Culbertson,
2000).
However, “the friendship and the confidence of people
can not be obtained if the police action is unfair and
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unreasonable.” That is why law enforcement organizations
must establish a name for truth, honesty, and public service
(Becker, 1970, p.232).
Contribution to Social Polarization
The second unwanted consequence of the misuse of
domestic intelligence is the social polarization in the
community. Social polarization is a potentially disastrous
problem in multicultural communities. These communities
house people of various origins who have very distinct
social values, cultural norms, religious beliefs, and
political views.
In a healthy society these varied groups should not be
isolated from one another. In the interests of community
peace and mutual learning, they should be encouraged to
gather celebrating their differences and commonalities, both
of which are protected by the state. On the other hand, in a
polarized society, people are “withdrawn into their shells
because of disharmony and antagonism, and pursue their own
interests without considering the benefits of society in
general” (Momboisse, 1967, p.16).
Government organizations in a multicultural society can
contribute to the polarization process by acting in a way
that favors one segment of the community over another. Such
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organizations act with prejudice, encouraging “us-them,
friend-enemy” separation while delivering their services
(Earle, 1970, p.131; Momboisse, 1967, p.16).
It is highly possible that, although they were intended
to protect the unity of the country, political
counterintelligence efforts contributed to the polarization
of the community. This assertion is based on the fact that
the targets selected for political counterintelligence
investigations were chosen based on their nationalities and
political ideologies. It was believed that the people who
were engaged in espionage and sabotage were influenced by
their country of origin. These people were seen as a likely
source of illegal activity because they were sympathetic to
the designs of foreign dictators. The FBI’s intelligence
investigations of Communists, and Fascists, and its
investigations of German immigrants and other aliens after
World War II was based on the assumption that foreign rulers
had influence on persons in the US (US Senate Select
Committee, 1976, vol.1).
Additionally, political counterintelligence divided the
world into “patriots and traitors, friends and enemies, us
and them,” and used its resources against the unfavorable
(Donner, 1980, p.6).
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Political intelligence was based on an “enemy within
approach” toward its targets. To provide public support in
the fight against its targets, the FBI tried to create a
negative public image of these individuals or groups by
disseminating derogatory information to the press, either
anonymously, or through “friendly” news contacts (Morgan,
1982, p.15; Williams, 1981; Donner, 1980, p.6; US Senate
Select Committee, 1976, vol.2, p.15).
These counterpropaganda activities possibly contributed
to social polarization by creating social antagonism in the
community between the social groups, possibly collecting the
FBI and its supporters on one side, and subversives and
their supporters on the other side.
Conclusion
In sum, the political use of the FBI is best explained
with the sociological theory of unfulfilled needs. On the
other hand, political intelligence/counterintelligence can
be based on the threat theory. Organizational autonomy,
ineffective executive oversight, subculture of the FBI,
unclear legal restrictions and secrecy may be seen as the
contributing factors.
The misuse of domestic intelligence breeds two types of
unwanted consequences. The first is the loss of public
90
faith; the second is the possible contribution to social
polarization in the community, both of which harm the
effective use of intelligence, and national unity. In order
to prevent these unwanted consequences, control and




Domestic intelligence activities are defined as the
gathering and storing, in advance, of information about
possible internal security threats. Although it aims at a
high ideal, namely, the prevention of national security
threats, domestic intelligence may be subject to political
exploitation. In this chapter, ways to prevent the political
misuse of domestic intelligence will be discussed, and a
model policy will be recommended.
Forms of Political Misuse
First of all, those who are in power may tend to use
intelligence to promote their interests rather than promote
the public good or law enforcement. They may also use
intelligence on their political opponents (Morgan, 1980;
Theoharis, 1978). Secondly, domestic intelligence can easily
be used for, or result in, the repression of those groups in
society who lawfully hold certain views that challenge the
socio-economic status quo (Marx, 1988; Theoharis, 1978).
Problems with Past Misuses
As previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this study,
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three problems related to the past political misuse of FBI
domestic intelligence have presented themselves. The first
problem relates to the definition of the targets and the
focus of the intelligence operations. Definitions of targets
that are broad or loose may cause innocent citizens to
become the targets of intelligence organizations. For
example, until the 1970’s, domestic intelligence operations
focused on "subversives" or "those who are related to an
organization supposedly advocating the overthrow of the
government.” This broad definition has arguably given
absolute discretionary power to the FBI to start an
intelligence investigation (Hudson, 2001, p.252).
The second problem is the limits of these operations.
More precisely, collected information does not necessarily
have to be related to national security or an expected
criminal act. While investigating alleged national security
threats, the private secrets of individuals under
investigation could be used by the FBI to degrade these
individuals. For example, facts obtained about their sexual
preferences, or secrets about their business could be saught
after even though these facts have nothing to do with a
proper national security investigation.
The third problem relates to the intelligence methods
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used. It is argued that little or no attention was paid to
the legality of the intelligence techniques used by the FBI.
Since foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence
separated or their boundaries were not clearly defined, some
domestic targets became subjected to very intrusive
intelligence methods that should only be used for foreign
intelligence targets. For example, warrantless entries were
conducted and private information was disseminated as
propaganda to discredit and disrepute certain people. Some
of these activities resulted in the repression of otherwise
lawful citizens who simply wished to peaceably change the
status quo.
The Consequences and Prevention of Misuse
The misuse of domestic intelligence creates two
unwanted consequences that have to be prevented for
intelligence work to be effective. The first of these
unwanted consequences involves public relations of an
intelligence organization. That is, intelligence that is
used for political reasons, rather than the public good,
undermines the public trust and discourages popular support
of intelligence organizations.
For example, as discussed in the Chapter 4 of this
study, while the American people initially perceived the FBI
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as honest and incorruptible, after the 1970’s favoritism
towards the FBI fell from eighty-four percent in 1965 to
thirty-seven percent in 1975. This loss of support occurred
after the public learned that the FBI did not use its
intelligence gathering resources for public gain (Olmsted,
1996; Donner, 1980; Elliff, 1979).
Domestic intelligence, when misused, may also
contribute to social polarization in a multicultural
society. Indeed, when a governmental agency favors one
segment of the community over another one, it encourages
antagonism and social isolation between the different
segments of the community. That agency highlights the
differences between two groups by waging what is essentially
ideological warfare using propaganda as the primary weapon.
In this case, the FBI and its supporters are on one side,
and the alleged internal security threats and their
supporters are on the other. Unrest and discord then occurs
between these two social groups.
Reasons for the Misuse and Contributing Factors
As discussed earlier in Chapter 4 of this study, there
are various theoretical explanations for the misuse of
domestic intelligence. The political use of domestic
intelligence is best explained by the sociological theory of
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unfulfilled needs. This theory links the political use of
domestic intelligence with corruption, and argues that
domestic intelligence resources may be used illegitimately
to expand personal powers of the political administrators.
This theory also argues that in order for an individual to
tend toward corruption, he or she must believe that the
potential benefits of corruption exceed its potential costs.
On the other hand, political counterintelligence is
associated with Threat theory. This theory argues that
states view as threats those who hold political views that
go against the status quo. These states then may use their
powers illegitimately to counter the dissidents. “Political
counterintelligence” is one type of this illegitimate use of
state power.
Because it is not legitimate, the political misuse of
domestic intelligence cannot be openly carried out in a
democratic state. However, there are certain characteristics
that are particular to intelligence organizations, including
the FBI, that enable the agency to behave illegitimately. As
discussed in Chapter 4 of the study, those characteristics
include organizational autonomy, a lack of clear legal
restrictions, ineffective oversight, and excessive secrecy.
It is also worth noting that certain “subcultural” aspects
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of the FBI contribute to its tendency to illegitimately use
intelligence. It must be noted that these factors are not
exclusive factors, rather interdependent. For example,
although they are separately evaluated, a lack of clear
legal restrictions contributes to organizational autonomy.
All of these factors contribute to the misuse of
domestic intelligence by giving the FBI a great deal of
organizational discretion concerning the focus, limits, and
methods of domestic intelligence. Organizational discretion
must have some bounds for the misuse of domestic
intelligence to be prevented.
Limiting Organizational Discretion
If placing limits on the organization’s discretionary
abilities in terms of domestic intelligence helps to prevent
misuse, how, then, can organizational discretion be limited?
Scholars have defined two methods that effectively limit
organizational discretion. First, define the authority,
scope, limits, and methods of intelligence. Second,
establish control and create accountability.
Defining Authority Scope, Limits and Methods of Intelligence
Investigations
To prevent misuse, the authority, scope, limits, and
methods of domestic intelligence should be clearly defined
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in legislation, which is not secret.
This legislation should outline specifically which
agencies are authorized to engage in intelligence activity.
It should state what kind of information agencies are and
are not permitted to collect, and should specify how this
information should be disseminated. Laws should be made that
indicate which individuals or groups should not be placed
under surveillance. Finally, the legislature should outline
which techniques of surveillance are proper and improper
under specified conditions (Elliff, 1971).
Legislative restrictions, where the FBI is concerned,
were first imposed in the 1970’s in the form of the Attorney
General’s Guidelines. The first of these guidelines were
issued in 1976 and known as “The Attorney General’s
Guidelines for FBI Domestic Security Investigations” (Levi
Guidelines). These guidelines were replaced with the
Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism
Investigations” in 1983 (Smith Guidelines) (Electronic
Privacy Information Center, 1995; Poveda, 1990; Elliff,
1979). Today, the guidelines of the 1983 are still in force
with minor revisions.
These guidelines were important attempts at limiting
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the organizational discretion that led to the misuse of
domestic intelligence. These guidelines, first of all,
defined the requirements for the use of different
intelligence methods. The Levi Guidelines categorized
domestic security investigations into three stages:
preliminary, limited, or full investigations. The
intelligence methods that could be applied in each of these
types were clearly defined (Oseth, 1985; Elliff, 1979).
On the other hand, the Smith Guidelines defined two
stages of intelligence work: the primary inquiry and the
investigation. They also loosened the restrictions on the
use of intelligence methods. For example, while informant
infiltration was not permitted during a preliminary
investigation under the Levi Guidelines, the Smith
guidelines approved the use informants even in the early
stages of an investigation.
These guidelines also defined the requirements for the
initiation of a domestic intelligence operation. While the
Levi guidelines required that a violent act related to
domestic or international terrorism occur before an
investigation could be initiated, the Smith Guidelines
required only “reasonable indication” that a federal law had
been broken. That is, the Smith Guidelines allowed the
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initiation of an investigation “when the facts or
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons
are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering
political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence and a violation of
criminal laws”. Under the Smith guidelines, then, it was
necessary to simply show a reasonable indication that a
federal law had been broken, whereas under the Levi
guidelines, it was necessary to demonstrate specific and
articulable facts that indicate a violation of the law
(Banks & Bowman, 2000).
In later years, the efficiency of the FBI was
questioned due to the success of terrorist attacks, such as
the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1993,
and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in
April 1995. Therefore, these administrative guidelines were
reinterpreted by the Government to enable the FBI to start
an investigation without any indication of criminal act
involving violence (Banks & Bowman, 2000; Poveda, 1999).
After 1995, the Administration once more reinterpreted
these guidelines. The new interpretation would permit broad
investigations of a “domestic terrorism group if that group
advocated violence or force with respect to achieving any
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political or social objectives” (Banks & Bowman, 2000,
p.41).
These guidelines also separated foreign intelligence
from domestic intelligence to prevent the contamination of
domestic intelligence with more intrusive foreign
intelligence techniques. However, in the light of the
difficulty of defining the boundaries of domestic and
international terrorism, these guidelines allowed the
transference of foreign intelligence investigative powers
and techniques to domestic intelligence investigators. In
these instances, domestic terror was defined as
“international” (Poveda, 1990).
It must be noted here that intelligence gathering was
also limited with the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974.
This act specifically limited the collection and maintenance
of personal information by federal agencies. For example,
personal information concerning political religious beliefs
of individuals were banned unless authorized by the subject
or in connection with a criminal investigation (Kessler,
1993; Donner, 1980; US Senate Select Committee, 1976,
vol.2).
On the other hand, proponents of intelligence work
argue that these limitations prevent intelligence
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organizations from accessing valuable information on
possible national security threats, and cripple their work
delaying initiation of an investigation, which may
potentially cause severe damage to the national security.
For example, as recently mentioned in the news, the
letter to the FBI written by a Minnesota Director of
Investigations indicates that if there had been fewer
restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering techniques,
9.11.2001 might have possibly been prevented. As understood
from her letter, she had a member of the Al Queda hijacking
team in custody and was petitioning FBI officials to allow
her to expand her investigations to the foreign intelligence
investigation techniques. Her request, however, was not
granted in time.
Despite its value in limiting organizational
discretion, one can hardly say that legislations defining
the authority, scope, and techniques of domestic
intelligence are enough to ensure conformity between
organizational behavior and community objectives. History
has proven that official action taken to prevent improper
conduct by the FBI, has little or no effect unless the
insiders, the agents of the FBI voluntarily agree to follow
the new rules.
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For example, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this study,
the Custodial Index Program was ordered to be discontinued
by the Attorney General in 1943. This program used FBI
resources to compile a list of “dangerous” persons who would
be taken into custody in case of war.
Even though this program no longer had authorization,
the Bureau continued it. A month after the Attorney
General’s order, the “Security Index,” as it was now called,
enabled FBI agents to continue "to investigate dangerous and
potentially dangerous" citizens and aliens and to compile a
list of their names (Theoharis, 1999; Theoharis, 1978,
p.43).
The FBI overcame another limitation in 1976 when it was
ordered to reduce the number of domestic security informants
that it used. To overcome this obstacle, instead of
dismissing some of its informants, the FBI simply
reclassified its domestic security informants as “foreign
counterintelligence” personnel (Theoharis, 1978).
Without any doubt, then, it is not enough to simply
hand down guidelines. In order to limit the misuse of
domestic intelligence, a control mechanism must be put in
place. This mechanism should, in effect, alter the behavior
of the individuals in the organization, encouraging them to
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bring the new guidelines to life.
Establishing Control and Accountability Mechanisms
Intelligence organizations have unique problems when it
comes to control and accountability, problems that are not
found in other governmental institutions. These problems
originate from the nature of intelligence work.
First of all, since they deal with national security
threats, any limitation imposed on their activities, such as
establishment of strict guidelines, and control and
accountability mechanisms, may potentially cripple their
effort to prevent these threats, which is never preferred by
any state.
Also, intelligence activities are carried out under a
veil of secrecy. Their finances are secret, their operations
and assessments are covert. It is not easy for the public
and other officials who are not a part of the intelligence
organizations to find out what is being carried out by these
organizations. Consequently, citizens tend to see these
organizations as mysterious, and uncontrolled (General
Accounting Office, 2000). This situation undermines public
trust in these organizations and prevents the public from
uncovering improper conduct, if there is any.
On the other hand, if an intelligence organization’s
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activities and techniques are disclosed they cannot be used
effectively. Therefore, control and accountability
mechanisms should be established that respect the need for
secrecy in intelligence organizations. The disclosure of
intelligence techniques or facts about ongoing intelligence
operations should not be permitted.
However, allowing a domestic intelligence agency to
police itself alone does not sound effective. Therefore,
domestic intelligence organizations, and oversight
organizations must disclose the improper actions of domestic
intelligence organizations by releasing oversight reports,
and informing the appropriate authorities so that counter
measures can be taken.
Another aspect of enabling control mechanisms in
domestic intelligence agencies, an aspect that applies to
all governmental organizations, is that it may make
officials feel harassed and under suspicion when control
attempts are abnormally intensive and aggressive. This type
of practice may make officials maintain “secrecy or decrease
the level of their activity” (Bayley, 1977, p.226).
Therefore, the level of oversight should not be so high that
officials may adversely react to it.
However, it is essential that a control and
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accountability mechanism be established for these
organizations. Scholars propose a multi-level control
mechanism to control law enforcement organizations. This
mechanism would determine whether organizations comply with
community objectives, the laws, rules, regulations and
policies. This mechanism utilizes internal and external
controls. External controls may be initiated in the
executive, judicial, legislative or social arenas (Bayley,
1985; Stone & Heather, 2000).
Internal oversight is simply carried out by the
organization itself. On the other hand, external oversight
is conducted by individuals or organizations other than the
particular organization itself.
Executive oversight is conducted by political
executives, either directly or through organizational action
on their behalf.
Judicial oversight is conducted by the courts to ensure
the organization in question honors the constitution, the
laws, and all applicable rules and regulations as it carries
out its daily activities. The courts impose sanctions if an
official is discovered to have acted unacceptably in his or
her duties. Additionally, they exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence from court cases.
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Legislative oversight is carried out by the Congress.
The most important duty of the Congress is to make laws
defining the scope, limits and methods of domestic
intelligence organizations. These laws are essential as
means to restrict organizational discretion. Legislators
also determine whether organizations carry out their duties
properly through the use of oversight committees. These
committees may be either temporary or permanent.
Social control is carried out by the citizens, the
media, and advocacy or research organizations. Social
control mechanisms ensure that organizational behavior
conforms to community objectives (Stone & Ward, 2000).
Each individual control mechanism is essential. They
each, in turn, fill the gaps that others leave in the
imposition of control. For example, internal control may be
ineffective if there is a strong subculture of solidarity
among the members of the organization. Additionally, where
domestic intelligence organizations are concerned, outsiders
can not, and sometimes, for their own protection, should
not, penetrate the organization. Consequently, it is left up
to intelligence employees and officials to release
information about organizational practices.
Similarly, executive control has some deficiencies. If
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it is carried out in the form of direct and active political
supervision, it may jeopardize the neutrality of the
organizations (Bayley, 1977). For example, before the 1970s,
the FBI received its authorization from, and reported
directly to, the President. This practice led the use of the
FBI as a mechanism that promoted the personal interest of
the Presidency.
Similarly, judicial control is criticized as being
reactive. That is, unless a case is brought before the
court, the judges will never learn of it (Stone & Ward,
2000).
Legislative control also has some deficiencies. The
members of oversight committees are often not expert on the
issues they oversee. Consequently, their effectiveness is
based on how well they are informed by the “experts.”
Temporary oversight committees have members who are less
informed than permanent committees. Temporary committees are
also reactive in nature. They are usually initiated after a
problem has occurred.
Social control has its problems as well. Individuals or
public interest groups must be allowed to monitor these
organizations to be informed of their activities and to be
aware of any misconduct. Citizens and public interest groups
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may be given the right to be informed of domestic
intelligence activities when certain legislation is passed
such as the Freedom of Information Act. These laws may
require periodic disclosures of information and the
declassification of past activities. They also enable
citizens to be aware of any investigations conducted by
intelligence organizations regarding themselves.
The FBI has a multi-level control system, consisting of
internal and external mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms
have existed in the past, but they were not effective. For
example, executive control was not exercised effectively
during the years when the FBI directly received its
authorization from, and reported political intelligence to,
the President.
On the other hand, although congressional oversight
commissions did exist, they were not really interested in
learning what the FBI was doing because the FBI had a
reputation for working for the common good.
Today, internal and external oversight mechanisms are
in place. The Internal oversight of the FBI is conducted by
the Headquarters and Inspection Unit, as well as the Office
of Professional Responsibility (Theoharis, 1999).
FBI headquarters periodically review investigations to
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renew or cancel their authorization. Investigations are
initially approved for a period up to 180 days. Additional
periods not to exceed 180 days can be designated only after
that investigation is reviewed and found appropriate by a
higher authority (US Department of Justice, 1989)
On the other hand, the Inspection Unit examines FBI
operations to ensure compliance with objectives, governing
laws, rules, regulations and policies (Headquarters and
Programs, 2001). In addition, the Office of Professional
Responsibility investigates claims of criminal conduct and
misconduct by FBI officials (Headquarters and Programs,
2001; Elliff, 1979).
The external oversight of the FBI is conducted by
executive organizations or boards such as the Office of the
Inspector General, Intelligence Oversight Board.
Legislative, Judicial, and Social Control mechanisms also
provide external oversight.
The Office of the Inspector General was founded in 1988
within the Department of Justice to detect and deter abuse,
and misconduct among department officials. It directly
reports to the Congress and the Office of Attorney General.
However, this office may not investigate the FBI unless it
is authorized by the office of the Attorney General.
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Normally, the FBI would carry out such investigations itself
through the Office of Professional Responsibility.
The Intelligence Oversight Board consists of at least
four members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. They review and receive regular reports from
the Inspector General and the Intelligence Community about,
domestic intelligence activities, at least once in a four-
month period, and from time to time as needed. It reports to
the President and submits violations of law to the Office of
Attorney General (Elliff, 1979; Oseth, 1985).
Legislative Control is carried out by the Congress.
There are two principal intelligence oversight committees
that provide routine oversight in Congress: The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and The House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
In addition to these committees there are other
congressional committees that become involved in oversight
matters from time to time. The judiciary committee in each
House is one of these committees (US General Accounting
Office, 2000).
These committees carry out hearings over claims of
misconduct, and over issues that are of public interest. For
example, in the past, both Committees played important roles
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in the intelligence reform activities of the 1970s, as
previously discussed in Chapter 2 of the study.
More recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted
a hearing entitled “Oversight: Restoring Confidence in the
FBI" on 20 June 2001. This hearing reviewed several recent
cases where the FBI did not act professionally. This
committee, for example, reviewed the case of an FBI agent
who allegedly worked as a Russia spy. It also inquired the
apparent sale of sensitive investigative information to an
organized crime group. FBI behavior in the Oklahoma bombing
case was also reviewed. In this case, the FBI revealed that
it had violated discovery obligations. That is, it failed to
turn over some documents to the defense.
On the other hand, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence conducted a hearing on the "Oversight of the
Daniel M. King Case” on 3 April 2001. The committee
investigated the prosecution of a spy case. It was claimed
that the confession of the defendant was forced, and there
was not enough credible evidence of espionage.
These committees have to be informed in a timely
manner, of the activities of intelligence organizations. It
is argued that the number of people involved with these
committees should be reduced in order to protect sensitive
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information about intelligence activities. To achieve this
reduction, it has been proposed that certain committees be
combined.
It is also argued that legislative oversight is limited
since the initiation of such oversight generally requires
the public disclosure of common abuses. Additionally, the
legislature needs insider information from the FBI to be
effective.
The FBI is also controlled by the Courts who establish
warrant requirements for certain intelligence techniques
such as wiretapping. If it is disclosed that evidence was
obtained through illegal methods, the court excludes that
evidence from the case. This forces the FBI to follow proper
procedures if a successful prosecution is wanted. In
addition, officers who violate individual rights may be
subject to civil and criminal litigation. However, as
discussed previously, judicial review is reactive. The civil
and criminal prosecution of an officer requires that those
whose rights were violated know it. This knowledge is
sometimes difficult to come by because of the secret nature
of the intelligence work.
At this point, it should be mentioned that it is
important for citizens and public interest groups to have
113
knowledge of the FBI’s domestic intelligence activities.
There are some laws that make FBI domestic intelligence
accessible to the public. While it was once not available,
individuals and public interest groups can now access to
information about intelligence activities. The Freedom of
Information Act is one of these laws. Based on this law, the
FBI publishes annual reports regarding its activities, and
replies to citizen inquiries. Similarly, Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act requires detailed
annual reports to be published on the number and nature of
wiretaps (Dempsey, 2000).
Conclusion
The misuse of domestic intelligence originates as the
product of one general problem, namely overly broad
organizational discretion. Defining the scope, limits and
methods of intelligence, as well as establishing a multi-
level control mechanism may effectively prevent the misuse
of domestic intelligence.
However, there are some problems with this model. It is
hardly possible, for example, to establish standards that
can be valid in every situation and in every time period.
Continuously changing national security threats, and the
operational tactics of intelligence agencies make domestic
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intelligence a metamorphic entity.
For example, no one can guarantee that today’s
domestic terrorism targets will remain unchanged twenty
years from now. Similarly, until recently, the Internet was
not thought of as a potential means of communication for
terrorist organizations. Intelligence organizations today
are forced to have legal and technical capability to monitor
the Internet communications between terrorists. The fact
that intelligence organizations are expected to react
promptly to these threats forces a state to give broad
autonomy to the intelligence organizations, especially
during a national security crisis, as explained in the
second chapter of the study.
However, once a threat is discovered by an
organization, it should be able to track the threat for a
temporary period of time until its action is approved or
rejected by the legislature.
On the other hand, it is hardly possible to guarantee
the absolute prevention of misuse, even using a multi level
control mechanism, because it is always possible to detour
regulations and controls. This highlights the need to create
an organizational culture that promotes compliance with
regulations. Such an organizational culture requires the
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careful selection and training of recruits. It also requires
a fair reward and promotions system based on objective
standards. The selection process, in addition, should be
isolated from political influence, and objective standards
should be set for recruitment. This will also prevent bias
or prejudice within the officials against those who are
lawful but with challenging ideas.
In conclusion, control of domestic intelligence can be
more easier if fair recruitment, training, and just reward
systems are set up in addition to defining its scope,
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